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INDE-X.
ACCOUNT. See AGENT, 4; HUSBAND AND WIRE, I1; NE EXEAT; TEWANT
IN COMMON.
ACCOUNT STATED.
A depositor in. a bank depositing a draft for collection, and his deposit-book
being balanced frequently without having the draft credited to him, and having
drawn out the balance remaining to his credit, is estopped after six years from
going behrid. the account stated. Hutchinson v. Bank, 183.
ACKNOWLEDGMENT. See HUSBAND AND WIPE, 24.
Officer must have legal proof of identity of person making. Jones v. Bac,
119.
-ACTION. See ARBITRATION, 1; BANKRuPTCY, 18, 19; BILLS 4ND NOTES, 9;
CORPORATION, 4, 12, I ; DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 6; JOINDER; MiLI
TARY SERViCr, 3; THREATENING LETTER. I
1. Declaration containing common money counts cannot be amended by
adding special count upon a lease for damages for not. carrying on farm
properly. O'Burt v. Kinne, 250. .
2. Complaint on express agreement wilI be sustained by evidence of an
implied, in N. Y.. Smith v. Lippincott, 570.
3. For wrongfully raising ore from land in another itate and selling and
converting proceeds is assignable. Hoy v. Smith, 570.
ACTS OF CONGRESS.
1793, March 2. Se'BANBRRUPToY, 8.
1828, May 12. See BANKRUPTCYO 2.
1846, -Aug. 6. Sea OPPICE, 4. •
1850, July 29. See SHIPPING, 5.
1856, Aug. 18: - See COPYRIGHT, 1.
1862. Feb. 13. See MILITARY SERVICE, 1.
1864, Feb.24. See.MILITAnY SER'VCE, 1.
1864, June 30.. See INTERNAL REVENUE.
1864, July 4. See MILITARY SERVICE, I.
1864, July 4. See BOUNTY, 2..
1865, March 3. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 9, 10.
1866, April 6. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 20.
1866, June 14. See BANKw, 2.
1866, July 13. See.INTERNAL REvExUE
1867, Feb. 27. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 5.
1867, March 2. See BANKRUPTOY; OFFICE, 1.
ADMINISTRATOR. See EXECUTOR.
ADMIRALTY. , See SHiPPING.
1. MATERIAL-MEN AND THEIR LIENS, 513.
2. A maritime lien does not exist upon a stationary structure like.a bridge,
and therefore a Court of Admiralty has no jurisdiction of a proceeding in res
VOL. XVI.-53. (833)
INDEX.
ADIIRALTY.
against a bridge to recover damages caused to vessels navigating a publi
stream. Galena Packet Co. v. Rock Island Bridge, 409.
3. Nature and extent of the admiralty jurisdiction in rem. Id.
4. The fact that one vessel carries a prohibited light does not absolve anothe.
from the observance of the caution and. nautical skill required by the exigen-
cies of the case. Greening v. Schooner Grey Eagle, 226.
5. Although a white light usually represents a vessel at anchor, an omisskn
to watch the light and ascertain from its bearings, whether the vessel is in
motion, is a neglect of ordinary care and skill, and makes the collision the
result of mutual fault. Id..
6. There may be circumstances under which a vessel that is unable to show
the proper lights may nevertheless continue her voyage at night. Id.
7. In navigating a river, omission to observe the usage in proper time ren-
ders vessel liable for collision. The Vanderbilt, 575.
8. If one of two parties injured by a colligion, stands idle until the other
has prosecuted his claim to judgment, he cannot share proceeds until the other
has been paid in fill. Woodworth v. Ins. Co., 63.
AGENT. See ATTORNEY; COIN, 2; DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 9, 10, 13; DEED.
2, 3; INSURANCE, I.
1. In emergencies has power to act for his principal without instructions
and is not responsible'if his action was in good faith though it turn out badly.
Greenleqf v. Afobdy, 184.
2. If general agent acts contrary to special instructions, principal is bound
as to third parties. Edwards v. Schafer, 510. .
3. Insurance by agent of insurance company to take effect on approval by
another agent.may bevalid without the latter's approval. Ins. Co. v. Webster,
.571.
4. Duty to render accounts. Gallup v. 3forrill, 633.
5. Not party to contract signed by him as agent, and therefore competent
witness. Lytle v. Bond, 829.
6. Refusal to deliver goods to principal except upon terms principal is not
bound to comply with, renders agent liable. Safford v. Kingsley, 830.
&GREEMENT. See ACTION, 2 ; CONTRACT.
AMENDMENT:" See ACTION, 1.
ANIAL FERIE NATURIE. See NEGLIGENCE, 1.
APPRENTICE.
1. Indenture valid where executed will be enforced in another state. Petrie
v. Voorhees, 696.
2. Covenant to support must be limited to tinie of service, and if right, is
settled at law in case where master dies equity will order assets set aside to
discharge the duty. Id.
3. Provision in will for support may be taken as discharge of the obligation.
Id.
ARBITRATION. See INSURANCE, 12; PARTNERSHIP, 10, 11.
1. An agreement under seal to submit to arbitration and a guarantee by a
third person not under seal that one of the parties shall abide the award cannot
be sued upon in the same action. Wallis v. Carpenter, 119.
2. One article of in award being complete and independent may be enforced
by itself. Lamphire v. Cowan, 185.
3. May be final between the parties though it affect third parties who are
not bound by it. Id.
4. Award of distinct acts to be done by each party may be separately
enforced. Title may pass by the award without further act of parties. Girdier
v. Carter, 250.
5. Supreme Court will not revise proceedings of a referee except for mistake
of law evident on the face of the award. Smith v. Sprague, 571
ARMY. See MILITARY SERVICE. -
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ARREST. See BANKRUPTCY, 18 ; CRIMINAL LAw, 6, 7.
ASSIGNMENT. See ACTION, 3.
ASSIGNMENT FOR BENEFIT OF CREDITORS. See B ~mnucy, 25,
30.
ASSOCIATION. See TRUST AND TRUSTEE, 4.
ASSUMPSIT. See ACTION, 1 ; ATTORNEY, 5; BILLS AND NOTES, 5; Cox-
TRACT, 8 ; INSURANCE, 1; PARENT AND CHILD.
1. Under the general issue in assumpsit, evidence is admissible to show that
the alleged cause of action did not exist at the commencement of the action.
Mason v. .Eldred, 402.
2. Not to be implied between members of family living together. Wilcox
v. Wilcox, 56.
3. Private promise to pay for performance of work in which the public
generally were as much interested as the promisor, will support assumpsit.
S ith v. .McKenaa, 120..
4. Not maintainable for value of goods wrongfully taken, unless they have
been sold and converted into money. Woodbury v€. Woodbury, 318.
5. Lies for value of goods tortionsly taken and sold, or wrongfully sold by
one in lawful possession. Foyev. outdard, 439.
ATTACHMENT. See TEOVER, 2 ; TRUSTEE, 1.
May be valid though for claim on notes not due. Jordan v. Keene, 439.
ATTORNEY. ee'Bou-TY, 2; CUSTOM, 2.
1. To impart a irrevocable quality to a power of attorney, as the result of
legal principles alone, there must co-exist with the power, an interest in the
thing or estate to be disposed of or managed, under the power. Hartley
Morris's Appeal, 106.
2. In a power of attorney constituting an ordinary agency to enforce settle-
ment of afi administrator's account, and to collect any moneys or property
that might belong to grantor, a clause allowing the attorneys to have for their
services one-half of the net proceeds of what they might recover or receive, does
not render the power irrevocable. Id.
3. In order to make an agreement for irrevocability, contained in a power
to transact business for the benefit of the principal, binding on him, there
must be a. consideration for it independent of the compensation to be rendered
for the service to be performed. Blackstone v. Buttermore, 108.
4. Where, in a power with a clause of irrevocability, the agreement was to
give the agent a certain.sum and portion of the proceeds of the sale he was
authorized to make, for his compensation, and he expendel, time, labor,. and
money thereunder, the power was not thereby.reidered irrevocable. Id -
5. For time, labor, and money expended, a revocation would leave the
principal liable on his implitd assumpsit.. Id.'
6. Has no authority to purchase for his client land sold under mortgage.
Savery v. Sypher, 571.
7. Service upon is sufficient, except where the proceed.ing is to bring the
party into contempt. 1"ynn v. Bailey, 634.
A UCTION.
Agreement to bid is valid. Wicker v. Hoppock, 376.
AWARD. See ARBITRATION.
BAGGAGE. See COM1MON.CARRIER, 2-5, 14-16; RAILROAD, 20-22.
BAILMENT.
1. A receipt for an article to be return.ed in three months, with condition
that it shall be a sale on payment of a certain price, is a bailment'only. Dun-
lap v. Gleason, 185.
2. Bailee may limit time of contract to deliver. 'Lance v. Greiner, 56
3. Bailee for hire may recover for injury to goods. Bliss v. Shaub,-57.
4. Bailment for sole benefit of bailor involves liability of bailee "only for
gross negligence. Spooner v. Mattoon, 696.
836 INDEX.
BAILMENT.
5. Soldier giving pocket-book to comrade to take care of. Spooner v. 3fa.
toon, 696.
BANK. See ACCOUNT STATED; BILs AND NOTES, 3, 16.
1. Erroneous certificate that note is good. Irving Bank v. Wetherald, 352.
2. The penal sanctions of sect. 3, Act of June 14th 1866, to secure the safe
keeping of public money, &c., are confined to officers of banks. U. S. v.
Hartwell, 446.
BANKRUPTCY.
I. Constitutionality.
1. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF nXmPTION cLAUSE, 55, 180.
2. So far as conformity in the procedure under executions out of fhe.Federal
courts, and out of the courts of the respective states, had been attained under
the Act of 1828, and the rules of practice in the Federal courts, the constitu-
tional requirement that the system of bankruptcy should be uniform, has been
fulfilled if the bankrupt law operates uniformly upon whatever would have'
been liable to execution if no such law had been passed, though the subjects
of its operation may not be in all respects the same in every one of the states.
-Re Appold, 624.
I1. Jurisdiction.
3. JURISDICTIONr oF.U. S. CIRCUIT AND DISTRICT COURTS, 642.
4. Where a judgment-creditor levies.an execution from a state -court and
the debtor files a petition in bankruptcy, the Court of Bankruptcy may either
allow the creditor to proceed with the execution, or may enjoin him and direct
the assignee to take possession and sell th goods, with leave to the creditor'
to apply for an. order directing the payment of his judgment out of the pro-.
ceeds. Mattei of Schnepf, 204.
5. Jurisdiction of Bankruptcy Court over creditors proceeding in state
courts. Note to Schnepf's case, 206.
6. Congress, by the Constitution of the United States, had the right to bring
all parties, estates, and interests connected with a bankrupt into the District
Court of the United States as a Court of Bankruptcy ; and to confer upon the
District Courts the authority to suspend all and every proceeding elsewhere;
and to command- obedience to their mandates, exclusive of all other jurisdic-
tions. But, by the Bankrupt Act of 1867, they have not done so. Matter of
Campbell, 100.
7. This act does not authorize the District-Courts of the United States to
issue injunctions to state courts, nor to the actors- or parties litigatfng before
them. Id.
8. The Act of 2d March 1793 prohibits it; and this -ct is not repealed by
the Bankrupt Law, either in express terms, or by implication. Id.
9. Courts of a state are independent tribunals, not deriving their authority
from the same sovereign, and as regards the District Court of the United
States, foreign tribunals, every way its equal, and over which the District
Court has no supervisory power, and the Bankrupt Law does not change the
relation of these courts to each other. Id.
10-. The authority conferred by the 40th section, to issue an injunction
against the bankrupt, and all other persons, has no reference to the state courts,
and it is a limitation of the sweeping provisions of the 1st section. Id.
11. It was designed to protect the property of a party not yet declared a
bankrupt, until his bankruptcy has been legally established. 1d. -
12. The principle decided in Campbell's Case, that the District Courts of
the United States have no power to issue injunctions to state -. urt,?: affirmed.
Matter of Burns, 105.
13. A judgment caniot be assailed in the Bankrupt Court, but the assignee
and creditors must resort to the state court, to test its validity. Id.
14. In a case of involuntary bankruptcy in which the debtor, being insol-
vent, or, having insolvency in contemplation, and intending to give a prefer-
ence, or to defeat or delay the operation of the Bankrupt Law, has, within six
months before the commencement of the proceedings in bankruptcy, given t
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a creditor who had reasonable cause to believe that a fraud on this law was
intended, or that the debtor was insolvent, a warrant of attorney under which
judgment has been confessed in a state court, and an execution has been
" levied upon his stock in trade, which has not as yet been sold under it, the
present Bankrupt Law gives to the courts of the United States, jurisdiction to
prohibit such creditor, by injunction, from proceeding further under such exe-
cution. Irving v. Hughes, 209.
15. The District Court, instead of issuing such an injunction under the sum-
mary jurisdiction in bankruptcy, may refuse to consider the subject unless
under a distinct auxiliary proceeding in equity against such a creditor. The
bill at the suit of the petitioning or any intervening creditor, may then be
prosecuted in the Circuit Court on behalf of the general body of creditors,
until the assignment in bankruptcy, after which the assignee may be substi-
tuted or added as a complainant; and if the proceedings in bankruptcy are
duly prosecuted, a preliminary injunction issued by the Circuit Court may, in
a proper case, be continued after answer, under such conditions as will pre-
serve the priority of the creditor thus restrained if the lien of his execution
should ultimately be established. Id.
16. An unimpugned creditor's lien having, before the commencemeit of
voluntary proceedings in bankruptcy, attached upon part of the bankrupt's
estate, no consideration of probable sacrifice of the subject of the lien under
judicial proceedings for its enforcement in a state court, will. induce a court
of the United States,to restrain, delay, or hinder the creditor from prosecuting
them. No equity' of the general body of tie bankrupt's creditors cn be
asserted -for their common, equal benefit, on she mere ground of doubtfulness
of hia title to the subject of the lien and the danger of consequent sacrifice at
a forced tale. Qucere, whether such an equity can be asserted on their behalf
in any case without such a, payment of his demand as may substitute the
'assignee in bankruptcy for him as to the lien. Ex parte Donaldson, 213.
17. A debtoi. made an assignment under the insolvent law of.Ohio on May
25th. 1867, and under it a state court took cognisauce of the matter. On July
17th a petition in bankruptcy was filed by a creditor. Hdd, that as to this
matter the Bankrupt Act of 1867 was in force'on May 25th, and the United
States court could rightfully, take jurisdiction- of the whole matter under the
petition filed in July. Perry v. Langley, 429.
18. Where a bankrupt is held under arrest upon state process, in an action
of tort in the nature of deceit, it being alleged in the declaration, that h6
obtained possession of the plaintiff's.goods under cQlor of a contract by means
of false and fraudulent representations, the United States DistZict Court has
no power to discharge the bankrupt upon a habeas corpus. Re Devoe, 690.
19. Evidence cannot be received- to contradict the declaration, and to show
that no such cause of action really exists as is therein set forth. Id.
JI. Acts of Bankruptcy. See post, 55, 56. "
20. In deciding whether giving a warrant td confess judgment is an act of
bankruptcy, the character,. &c., of the alleged bankrupt's. bu4ness may be
taken into consideration. Matter of Leeds,' 693.
21. A suspension of payment of commercial paper for fourteen days is not,
unless fraudulent, an act of bankruptcy.' 7d.
22. A stopping of payment of his commercial paper by a merchant orbanker,
in order to constitute an act of Bankruptcy under sect. 39 of the Bankrupt
Act, must be both fraudulent at first and be continued for fourteen days.
Matter of the Jersey City Windoio Glass Company; 419. .
23. But a stoppage continued for fourteen days is priindfacie fraudulent,
and casts'on the debtor the burden of proving his solvency and that his stop-.
page will not have the effect of defrauding any creditor. Id.
24. A petitioning creditor, in proceedings for involuntary bankruptcy, not
aaving alleged that the debtor's stoppage for fourteen days was fraudulent,
was allowed to amend his petition by adding that allegation. Id.
25. A general assignment for the benefit of all his~creditors, by an insolvent
debtor, prior to the 1st of June 1867, is not necessarily fraudulent nor for the
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purpose of delaying or hindering creditors, and, therefore, not necessarily an
act of bankruptcy. Re Wells and Son, 163.
26. Section 39 of the Bankrupt Act, in enumerating among acts of bank-
ruptcy the fraudulent stopping of payment of his commercial paper by a banker,
merchant, &c., embraces two cases :-
1. Afraudulent stoppage, which is per se an act of bankruptcy, for which
proceedings may be immediately commenced; and
2. A stoppage not fraudulent, but which becomes an act of bankruptcy
by continuing for fourteen days. Id.
27. A general assignment by an insolvent debtor, though made for the
benefit of all his creditors, is an act of bankruptcy. Perry v. Langley, 429.
28. Where a creditor is about to get a judgment against his debtor, and the
latter makes a general assignment under a state insolvent law for the benefit
of his creditors, this is a conveyance with intent to delay, defraud, and hinder
the creditor, and an act of bankruptcy under sect. 39 of Bankrupt Act. Id.
29. It comes also under the description of a conveyance to defeat or delay
the operation of the Bankrupt Act. Id.
30. Where a debtor made an assignment under a state insolvent law, and
a crediot applied to the state court to have the security of the assignees
increased, this was not such an assent to the proceedings as estopped him from
claiming that the assignment was an act of bankruptcy. Id.
IV. Effect of the institution of proceedings.
31. Liens, by the Bankrupt Law, are held sacred, and the creditor is
expressly protected by the 14th, 15th, and 20th sections of the act. Matter
of Campbell, 100.
32. The bankrupt's final certificate discharges his person and future acqui-
sitions; but the lien-creditor is entitled to satisfaction out of the property sub-
ject.to lien. Id.
33. The lien of a levy made by a judgment-creditor under an execution from
a state court, is not disturbed by the debtors filing a petition in bankruptcy.
Matter of Sehnepf , 204.
34. A debt fraudulently contracted is not discharged, and the court will
not therefore interfere to prevent the creditor from enforcing his claim by
imprisonment, even during the pendency of the pr6ceedings in bankruptcy,
unless such inteiference be necessary to enable the court to exercise its proper
jurisdiction ii the case. Be Pettis, 695.
V. Practice. See ante, 4,24; post, 51, 52, 61.
35. Where a creditor made a motion for an order to examine-a bankrupt
before the first meeting of creditors, and the bankrupt objected that no such
order could be made at such time, this raised an issue of law which the register
should have certified to the court. Matter of Patterson, 26.
36. But if the bankrupt argues and submits the question to the judgment of
the register, he waives his right to a certificate, and if, after a decision against
him, he submits his points and requests an adjourninent to the court, he is too
late. After a decision by the register there is no issue to certify. Id.
37. A creditor has a 'right to prove his' claim at any time after the com-
mencement of proceedings, and having done so has a right to an order for the
examination of the bankrupt under section 26, witbou waiting for the meeting
of creditors. Id.
38. If depositions in proof of claims are filed before the day appointed for
the meeting of creditors, the register is not bound to notify the bankrupt. Id.
39. Notwithstanding the filing of such a deposition and entering the claim
on the list, the register may still, under section 23, at the first meeting of
creditors postpone the proof of the claim and exclude the creditor from voting
in the choice of an assignee. I.:
40. The court has, under section 22, full control at all times, of all debts,
and all proofs of debts, even after the depositions in proof have been filed;
and the bankrupt can, at the first meeting of. creditors, object, under section
23, to the validity of, and the right to prove any debts, without regard to the
time the depositions in proof were filed. Id.
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41. A creditor holding security, although he has proved his debt under sec-
tion 22, cannot vote in the election of an assignee. Matter of Davis t ,on, Ju.
0 42. The creation of a debt by fraud is not a ground for refusing a discharge
to a bankrupt. Matter of Rosenfidd, 618.
43. A specification stating that debt had been created by fraud is not a good
specification, and will be stricken out on motion. Id.
44. A bankrupt cannot be examined for the purpose of showing that the
debt was created by fraud. Id.
45. A fraudulent conveyance made, or a fraudulent preference given,
before the passage of the Bankrupt Act, are neither 'of them. good grounds
upon which to oppose a discharge. Such a conveyance or preference does not
come within the terms of section 29 of said act,,and a specification alleging
such a conveyance or preference will be stricken out on motion. ' Id.
46. The difference explained between. the meaning ot the following phrases
in section 29, viz. - " Since the passage of this act," and " subsequently to the
* passage of this act.' Id.
47. By the term "fraudulent preference," used in item nine of section 29.
is meant only a preference in fraud of the Bankrupt Act, that is, contrary to
its provisions. Id.
48. Where a member of a late copartnership files his individual petition
under the Bankrupt Act, and inserts in his schedules debts contracted by said
copartnership, and there are no copartnership assets to be administered, he
will be entitled to be discharged from all his debts, individual as well as
copartnership:. Re Abbe, 824.
49. It is not neaessary, in such a case, to make the other partners parties to
the prbceedings, or to have them brought in under General Order No. 18. Id.
50...The cases of William H. Little, Bankrupt Register 74, and of Alexander
-lear, Id. 201, commented upon. Id.
'VI. Discharge.. See'ante, 34, 42, 45, 48.
51. Where at the time of the application for a discharge; the assignee has
neither received nor paid any moneys on account of the estate, the case is to
- ba regarded as one in which no assets'have come into his hands. Matter of
Dodge, 438.
52. Any creditor of a bankrupt.may oppose the discharge, whether he have
proven his debt or not. Matter qf Shepard, 484.
VII. Property exempted.
53. Under the present bankrupt law of the United States, and the siate
exemption laws incorporated with it, the exemption of such property, real or
personal, of the appraised value of $300, as a bankrupt in Pennsylvania may
elect to retain as exempt inder the laws of the state, is not included in but is
additional to the exception from the operation of the bankrupt liw, of such"
necessary and suitable articles, not exceeding in value $500, as with dui refer-
ence, in their amout, to the bankrupt's family,- condition, and circumstances,
may be designated knd set apart by the assignee, subject to the court's revi-
sion. Re David Ruth, 157.
54. But this exception'to the full valud of $500, ought not to be allowed in
all cases, without discrimination or measure. Id.
VIII. Rights and Duties of Assignee. See ante, "4, 15.
55. An assignee in bankruptcy may maintain an action to set aside a fraudu-
lent conveyance by the debtor before he was adjudged a bankrupt, even though
the conveyance was befbre the passage of the Bankrupt Act. Bradshaw.
Assignee, &c., v. Klein, 505.'
56. Such action is nob limited to conveyances made within- six monsi-s of
the filifig of the petition. The general language. of the 14th section. of -the*
Bankrupt Act is not limited in this respect by the 35th section. Id.
57. Qucere, Whether under the present bankrupt law of the United. States,
o ods of the estate in he hands of the assignee are distrainable for rent?
e Appold, 624.
58. If they are not, it is because they are not- less in legal custody than
goods taken in execution; and under the equity of any laws of-the respective
INDEX.
BANKRUPTCY.
states which, like the English statute 8 Ann. c. 14, entitle a landlord to pay-
went of rent accrued, not exceeding one year's, out of the proceeds of goods
sold under an execution, the landlord, who is prevented from distraining, iy
demand such an amount of rent from the assignee in bankruptcy. Be Appold,
624.
59. Such a rule of decision is not inconsistent with apparently contrary
decisions under the English system of bankruptcy. Id.
60. Though rent, as such, may not accrue during the proceedings in bank.
ruptcy, an equal charge for storage may, for a certain period, under certain
circumstances, be incurred by the assignee. Id.
IX. Proof of Debts. See ante, 37-41 ; post, 74; CONFEDERATE STATES, 1.
61. A creditor who has proved his debt has a right to examine a bankrupt
under section 26 of the act, although his debt may appear to be barred by the
Statute of Limitations of the state in which, the proceedings are instituted.
Matter of Bay, 283.
62. A debt barred by the- Statute of Limitations is not " due and payable '
so as to be provable in bankruptcy, but as there is no limitation in the Bank-
ruptcy Act whose operation is coextensive with the limits of the United States,
no claim can be held barred unless it be shown that it is not recoverable in
any part of the United States. Id.
63. A debt barred by the Statute of Limitations of the state where the bank-
rupt resides cannot be proved against the estate in bankruptcy. Matter of
Kingsley, 423.
64. The entry of a debt upon the schedule by a benkrupt is not such an
acknowledgment or new promise as will revive the debt. .d.
65. A debt against a bankrupt's estate may be proven before a United States
commissioner, although the bankrupt and creditor both reside in the same
judicial district. Matter of Shepard. 484.
66. A debt barred by the Statute of Limitations of the state in which tht
bankrupt resides may still be proven against his estate in bankruptcy. Id.
67. A creditor who, after making his deposition to prove his debt, retains
possession of the deposition and does not allow it to pass into the hands of the
assignee in bankruptcy, is not a creditor who has proven his debt.. Id.
XK. Distribution.
68. Where there are both individual and partnership creditors of a bankrupt,
but the assets are individual only, though mainly consisting of goods purchased
by the bankrupt from the partnership on its dissolution prior to the bank-
ruptcy, and being principally the same goods in the purchase of which the
partnership debts had originated; the partnership creditors will be entitled to
be paid pari passu with the individual creditors. Matter of.Tewett, 291.
69. Where A., one of two partners, sells his interest in the concern to his
copartner, B., taking his notes therefor, and B- becomes bankrupt, leaving
some of the notes unpaid, A. cannot receive'a dividend from the assignee
until all the partnership debts have been paid. Matter of Jewett, 294.
70. A bondfide transfer of partnership effects by one member of the part-
nership to another vests the title in the transferee as his separate estate.
Matter of Byrne, 499.
71. Where there are both joint and separate debts, proved in a bankruptcy
on a separate petition, the joint creditors are not entitled to participate in the
distribution of the assets until the separate creditors are paid in full. .d.
72. The exception in the general rule of law, which allows joint creditors
to receive dividends pari passu with the separate creditors in cases where there
is no joint estate and no solvent partner, is inoperative under the Bankrupt
Law of 1867. Id.
73. A. transferred his interest in partnership effects to his copartner B., on
the 2d of October, on his (B.'s) promise to pay the firm debts; without buy-
ing any new stock or making any effort to continue the business, B. filed his
petition in bankruptcy on the 7th of October.: held, that the transfer was
accepted by B. in contemplation of filing his petition in bankruptcy, and that
the transfer was void as a fraud on the creditors of the partnership. Id.
74. A creditor of a partnership firm holding notes both of the firm and of
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the individual partners for a firm-debt, is entitled to prove in bankruptcy his
claims on the firm-note against the joint estate, and on the individual notes
against the separate estates of the makers. Mead v.'Nat. Bank of Fayette-
ville, 818.
75. By the English practice, such a creditor must elect which estate he
will prove against, but whether such a rule is proper under our Bankrupt
Law, dubitatur. Id.
XI. Costs.
. 76. A party may serve. a subpcena on his witnesses, and in cases where he
succeeds in the trial recover his costs therefor. Gordon v. Stott, 749.
77. In cases of involuntary bankruptcy and a trial by jury, a docket fee of
$20 is taxable in favor of the counsel of the successful party. . I?
78. In proceedings in voluntary bankruptcy a docket fee -is not taxable,
except in those voluntary cases, when under the 31st section of the act the
court is authorized to direct a trial upon specifications of objections to the
bankrupt's discharge. Id.
79. The word trial in the Bankrupt Act means a trial by jury. Id.
BASTARDY.
Money paid on affiliation order is solely for support of child. Drake v.
Sharon, 571.
BIGAMY. See HUSBAND AN-D WI,,, 2, 3.
BILL OF CREDIT. -See CONmDEnATn STATEn, 2.
BILL OF LADINk. - See CoMMON Ckxuxn 7; Vzz-Mon, 15-18.
BILLS AND NOTES. See BANxutroTv, I; Evwi roC, 6; PAuT5rmm,
1-4; STAMPS, 3; SurzTy, 1.
L What is a Negotiable Instrument. •
I. Instrument "payable out of my separate property and estate' I is a pro-
missory n6te. Skillen v. Richmond, 251.
2. Signed by mark maybe good, apd if signature not denied it is held
admitted under rule of court. Willoughby,. Moulton, 251.
3. Certificate of deposit payable on presentation is negotiable. B'-sk v.
Bank, 758. -
4. Note for sum certain, "and such additional premium as may becom)
due," not negotiable. Marrett v. Ins. Co., 440.
II. Consideration.
5. Note being void for watt of stamp payee may rerover in assumpsit on
original consideration.- Wilson v. Carey, 634.
I. Rights and Liabilities qf Parties. .See HUSBAND AN5D WIFI 27. ",'
6. A promissory note being presented by one bank at another baik where
it was made payable, ws certified to be good and was then stamped "paid"
by the presenting bank, but on the same day the maker's want of funds beiig
discovered, notice was. given to the presenting bank, which however declined
to cancel the certificate. The certifyiig bank then paid the amount, took the
note and re-presented it at its own countqr, had it duly protested and notified
the indorsers. Held, that the facts did not amount to payment of the note and
the bank was entitled to recover from the indorsers. Irving Bank v. 'Wethe-
rald, 352.
7. The certifying bank having given notice of its mistake to the presenting
bank before the latter had'done or omitted any hat by which its rights were
impaired, the certifying bank was released from liability on its erroneous cer-
tificate, and need not have paid the amount of the note. Id. ..
8. Indorsement by several is only primd facie evidence of the comitract as
between themselves, though it is conclusive between them and-thir.d parties.
Smith v. Morrill, 186.
9. B. and C. gave joint note to A. for land; 0., conveyed his interest to
B. ; action for money had and received lies bv' A. against B. for the whole
amount. Woodbury v. Woodbury, 318.
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10. Indorsement by A. of B.'s name in B.'s presence ani by his direction
is good. Woodbury/v. Woodbury, 318.
11. Any defence against payee may be made against holder not bond fide
for value. Van Valkenburgh v. Stupplebeen, 380.
12. Holder as security may refuse to deliver until payment of the debt.
Benoir v. Paquin, 634.
13. Circumstances to put holder on inquiry. Id.
IV. Demand and notice.
14. Acts amounting to waiver of demand and notice. Keyes v. Winter, 439.
15. Note 4" payable in officer's fees," &c., is payable on demand. Thrall
v. ead, 832.
16. Holder of certificate of deposit payable to ord~r bf A. on presentation
cannot sue until demand has been made. Bank v. Bank, 758.
17. Demand note payable in goods if not paid on demand at reasonabi
time becomes payable in money. Read v. Sturtevant, 831.
BLOCKADE. See INTERNATiONAL LAW.
BOND. See COURTS,-5 ; MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 3; STAMP, 4, 5.
1. Coupon detached from bond is still lien under the mortgage. Miller er
al. v. R. I. Co,, 762.
2. Coupon is part of the mortgage-debt, and holder on foreclosure is entitled
to share pro rata. Id.
3. Loss of bond no objection to its payment on indemnity furnished. Id
BONDED WAREHOUSE. See VENDoR, 20.
BOUNTY.
1. Town voting to pay bounty to those who should enlist and be credited to
its quota, bound to pay those enlisted prior thereto, but mustered in and e'e-
dited to quota subseque, itly. .ohnson v. Neuqfane 634.
2. The 12th and 13th sections of the act of 1864, limiting the compen-
sation of agents for making the necessary papers to establish a claim for
pension, bounty, or other allowance before the pension office, to ten dollars,
and declaring it to be a high misdemeanor for any such person to demand or
receive any greater compensation than ten dollars for his services under the
Pension Act, &c., is not unconstitutional. U. S. v. Fairchilds, 306.
BRIDGE. See A-DMIRALTY, 2; CONSTITUT;ONAL LA-w, 5.
BROIER. See MILITARY SERVICE, 2, 3.
1. Real estate broker is the agent of vendor, and his services niust be the
efficient cause of the sale. Earp v. Cummins, 311.
2. Purchase of stock on margin not a pledge for'payment of money requir
ing notice to make legal sale. Hanks v. Drake, 381.
3. Broker has right to call on his principa to make good his margin, and
on failure in reasonable time, to sell. Id.
4. Two hours not reasonable time, without further evidence, but acts of
principal may amount to ratification. Id.
5. If after demand principal fails to make good his margin, broker may sell
without further notice. Markham v. Jordan, 572.
CASES APPROVED, OVERRULED, ETC.
Campbell's Case, ante 400, affirmed. Matter of Burns, 105.
Canal Co. v. Sansom, I Binn. 70, criticised. Mining Co. v. Lev.y, 312.
Frear's Case, Bankrupt Reg. 201, commented on. Re Abbe, 824.
Little's Case, Bankrupt Reg. 74, commented on. Re Abbe, 824.
N. J. Railroad Co. v. Kennard, 9 Harris 203, overruled. P. 4- C. R. .R
Co. v. M:Clurq, 277.
Palmer v. Ridge Mining Co., 10 Casey 288, criticised. Mining Co. v.
Levy, 312.
Reese v. Montgomery Co. Bank, 7 Casey 78, explained. Curry v. Scott,
313.
Sheehy v. Mandeville, 6 Cranch 254, criticised. Mason v. Bldred, 402.
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CERTIFICATE OF DEPOSIT. See BILLS AND NOTES, 3, 16.
CHECK.
Not an assignment of funds. Lunt v. Bank, 376.
CITIZEN. See CONFEDERATE STATES$ 5; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 1, 4; TExAs.
CIVIL RIGHTS BILL. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 20
COIN.
1. Depositor in bank having a balance to his credit in coin, and also in
.treasury notes, drew for coin, but was tendered notes only-evidence of cus-
tom of banks to pay coin for checks on such balances not admissible. Thomp-
son v. Riggs, 122.
2. In action against an agent for refusing to. deliver bonds bought for the
principal, the latter may, as an element of damages, prove that the bonds
were payable in gold coin, and also the premium on coin. The Legal Tender
Acts do not excludle such evidence from the jury, nor do they allow an agent
to receive gold and pay currency to his principal. Simpkins v. Low, 508.
COLLATERAL INHERITANCE TAX. See TAXATiON, 3.
COLf2SION. See ADMIRALTY.
CO MISSIONS. See TRUST, 5.
COMION CARRIER. See RAILROAD; STAMP, I; TELEGRAPH COMPANY.
1. A periQn receiving a printed notice on his ticket or check at the time of
delivering his goods to a carrier is to be charged with actual knowledge of the
contents of the printed notice. Hopkins v. Westcott, 533.
2. Where such a notice stated that the carrier would not be responsible 'for
an amount exceeding $100 upon any article," the words "any article" mean
any separate article, not a trunk with its contents. Id.
3. Therefore, a traveller who gave a single trunk to a cearrier and received
such a notice, was allowed to recover the value of separate articles in the
trunk amounting to $700. Id.
. 4. Baggage. includes such articles as -are usually ,carried by travellers.
Books and.even manuscripts may be baggage, according to the circumstances
and the business of the traveller-. Id.
5. In this case a student going to college was allowe4 to recovert-he value
of manuscripts which were necessary to the prosecution of his studies. -1.
6. A carrier may by special contract limit his liability except as against his
own negligence. Farnram v. C. 4- A. R. R. 'Co., 172..
7. Where a person delivers goods io a carrier and receives a bill of lading
expressing that the goods are received for transportation subject to the condi-
tions on.the back of the bill, by one of which the carrier's liability is limited
to a certain rate per lb., this constitutes a special contract by the parties, and
the carrier, in the. absence 'of proof of negligence, is only liable at the rate
agreed-upon. Id.
8. Goods were received by defendants, a railroad company, under a special
contract as set forth in the preceding paragraph, and-were safely carried to
their wharf at New York, and placed on the wharf ready for delivery, but
before the plaintiffs had notice of their arrival or opportunity to remove them,
a fire broke out on board a steamei of the defendants lying at the wharf, which
entirely consumed the boat, and also the wharf and the goods thereon. There
wa no evidence as to the origin of the fire. Held, that plaintiffis could not
recover more than the special rate agreed upon without proving negligence of
the defendants. Id.
9. May by express stipulation limit liability even for negligence. .Pientiee
v. Decker, 377.
10. Mere acceptance of card or ticket with limitation of liability will not
establish a contract on part of passenger. Id.
11. Cannot limit liability by note on card or ticket, unless there is further
evidence of agreement by other party than the* mere acceptance of. the card.
Limburger v. Westcott, 507.
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12. Cannot limit liability so as to excuse Wvant of ordinary care. Mann v.
Birchard, 702.
13. Burden is on plaintiff to show want of ordinary care, ;.ut unusual delay
in delivery is primdfacie evidence. Id.
14. Not liable for loss of baggage not claimed by traveller. in reasonable
time after end of journey. Jones v. Trans. Co., 634.
15. Seventeen hours held not a reasonable time under the circumstances.
Id.
16. Fact that journey ended on Sunday and the law of the state prohibited
work or travelling on that day did not affect the case. Id.
17. In action for delay in transporting flour, decline in market value is
proper element of damages. Weston v. R. R. Co., 440.
18. Allegation of special damage. Roberts v. Graham, 377.
CONDITION. See WILL, 9.
CONFEDERATE STATES. See INsURANCE, 10.
1. A promissory note, th consideration of which was a loan of Confederate
money, is not provable as a claim in bankruptcy against the maker. Matter
of Milner, 371.
2. Confederate treasury notes were not bills of credit within the prohibition
of the Constitution of the United States; but were illegal, because issued by a
pretended and revolutionary government'set up within the limits of the.United
States. Id.
3. Confederate treasury notes were not an illegal consideration in contracts
between citizens of the Confederate States, unless it.was the intent of the par-
ties to the contract thereby to aid the rebellion. .Phillips v. Hooker, 40.
4. Thereforewhere one citizen of North Carolina, in 1862, bought a house
of another, paid for it in Confederate notes, and went into possession, the
contract cannot be set aside by a court as founded on an illegal consideration.
Id.
5. Citizens faithful to the United States who resided in the seceding states
during part of the war, but escaped to the loyal states or neutral countries,
lost no rights by temporary residence in the seceding states. The Peterhoffl 62.
CONFLICT OF LAWS. See APPRENTICE, 1 ; BJaRUPTCY, II.P REAL
ESTATR, 2.
CONSIDERATION. See BILLS AND NOTES, 5; CONFEDERATE STATES, 3;
COiiSTITUTIONAL LAw, 8; CONTRACT, 9-13; DEBTOR AND CRE&IToR, 4,
5; DEED, 4.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. See BAN&nUPTCY, I.; :BOUNTY, 2; COIN; Cox-
FEDERATE STATES, 2; MILITARY SERVICE, .
I. Power of Executive. See OFFI cE, 1, 2.
II. Power of Congress. See OFFICE, 1, 2.
1. Congress may deprive a criminal of his citizenship and thereby affect his"
right to vote, but the direct regulation of the qualification of voters in a state
is not in the province of Congress. Huber v. Reily, 57.
III. Power of Legislature. See CORPORATION, 9 ; post, 15-19.
2. Prohibition against legislative allowance of any private claim extends
to claims against counties as well as the state. "People v. Sherman, 186.
3. Legislative control over tide-waters-rights of riparian owners to water
in front of them. Steamboat Co. v. Transportation Co., 759.
IV. Judicial Power. See COURTS ; post, 18.
V. Right of Free Passage from State to State.
4. Special state tax on railroad companies for passengers carried out of the
state by them is not void as a duty on exports nor as a regulation of com-
merce, but it is in derogation of the Federal Government's right to require
the presence and service of its citizens at any point where the functions of
government are to be performed, and also of the citizen's right of free access
INDEX.
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to the seat of government or any public Federal offices. Crandall v. Nevada,
440.
VI. Regulation of Commerce. See ante,. 4.
5. The act of 1867 declaring a bridge across the Mississippi river at Clinton
"a lawful structure and a post-route," is constitutional ; and under it the Cir-
cuit Court of the United States will dismiss a bill to procure the abatement of
the bridge as a nuisance, based on the ground that it presents a serious obstruc-
tion to the navigation of the river, although the suit for this purpose was
pinding at the time the Act of Congress was passed. Gray v. Clinton Bridge,
149
6. The power of Congress to regulate commerce extends to commerce on
land, carried on by railroads which are parts of lines of inter-state communi-
cation as well as to commerce carried on by vessels : and such railroads may
be regulated by Congress as well as $teamboats: Per MILLER, J. Id.
7. The commercial clause of the Constitution expounded by MILLER, J., in
reference to railways and boats as instruments of commerce. Id.
VII. Obligation of Contracts.
8. A legislative concession i'mbraced in the charter of a corporation per-
petually exempting its property from taxation, without a sufficient correspond-
ing consideration yielded by the corporatio%, is revocable at the .pleasure of
the state. And the act of the state in revoking such a concession, is not uncon-
stitutional as impairing the obligation of a contract. _Rowse v. Washlingion
University, 399..
VIII. Due Process of Law, and Ex post facto Laws.
9. What "due process of law" includes. A deserter is not deprived of his
right to vote by the Act of 1865 until adjudged a deserter by court-martial.
Huber v. Reily, 57.
10. Act of 3d March 1$65, imposing penalty for desertion, is not ex post
facto. Id. .
IX. Taking Private Property.
11. Legislature may authorize cofistruction of. public works without com-
pensation to property injured if not actually-takenm. Arnold v. R. B. Co., 380.
12. Public bridge belonging to county not within the constitutional prohibi-
tion. Freeholders, 4-c., v. Turnpike Co., 759.
13. But a charter to turnpike company requiring it to pay owners of lands
includes county bridge. Id.
14. Even if damages for taking such bridge were only nominal the county
is entitled to restrain the use of it until damages are assessed and title has passed
to the company. - d.
15. Legislature has no power to transfer one man's property to another
without his consent, even with compensation. It is not anexercise of the law-
making power given to the legislature. Coster v. Tide Water Co., 760.
16. Grant of power tolone man to improve property of another without his
consent at compensation to be fixed by third person, is void as beyond the
powers of the legislature. Id.
17. Private property may be taken by eminent domaip for public use on
adequate compensation, but the ise meaut is by the government itself or
the general public or some portion pf it. Id.
.18. Whether the use in question is a public use is a judicial question. Id.
19. Eminent domain and taxation may be employed to reclaim large tracts
of land, and the question of using these powers for such purpose is with tha
legislature, but to compel the owner to bear the expehse of improvement
beyond his particular advantage is taking his property without compensatiop
and unconstitutional. Tide Water Co. v. Coster,. 761. . -
X. Abolition of Slavery.
20. Under the 13th Amendment, abolishing slavery and giving to Con-
gress "power to enforce this Article by appropriate legislation," the Act of
1866, known as the CIVIL RIGHTS LAW, is constitutional. United States v.
Rhodes, 233.
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21. Under this act all persons stand upon a plane of equality before tht
law, as respects the civil rights therein mentioned and intended to be pro
tected, without distinction as to race or color or any previous condition of
slavery. United States v. Rhodes, 233.
22. If a state law denies any of these rights, e. g., the right of colored
persons to testify, this act gives'to the courts of the United States jurisdiction
of all causes, civil and criminal, which affect or concern such persons. Id.
23. Where a white person commits the crime of burglary, by breaking and
entering the house of a colored person, in a state whose laws deny to such
colored person the right to testify against the accused, the latter may be in-
dicted, prosecuted, and convicted for such offence in the Courts of the United
States. Id.
CONTRACT. See CONFEDERATE STATES, 3; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 8; COt-
PORATION, 4, 12, 13,- CUSTOM, I ; FRAUDS, STATUTE OF; INTERNATIONAL
LAW, I ; PUBLIC WORKS; SALE; VENDOR AND PURCHASER.
1. Where a person employed for a certain term at a fixed salary payable
monthly is wrongfully discharged before the end of the term, he may sue for
each month's salary as it becomes due; and the first judgment will not be a
bar to another action for salary subsequently coming due. Huntington v. Og-
densburgh R. R. Co., 143. *
2. Entire and divisible contracts considered. Note to Huntington v. 0g-
densburgh, 4-c., R. R. Co., 147.
3. Where parties residing at a distance from each other agree to communi-
ate by telegraph in their business transactions, the same rules apply in
determining whether a contract has been made as in cases of communications
by letter. Trevor et al. v. Wood et al., 215.
4. Therefore, an offer accepted by telegraph constitutes a contract, although
the party making the offer attempts 'to revoke it before his receipt of the
acceptance. Td.
5. An acceptance by letter of an offer is sufficient to make a contract, n" i by
virtue of being sent through the public mail, but because it is an overt act*
manifesting the intention of the acceptor, and thus making the aggregatio men-
tium which is the essence of a contract. Id.
6. Memorandum made and signed by one party in his private account book
not a contract. Stannard v. Smith, 831.
7. Party having right to rescind must elect to do so in reasonable time.
Willoughby v. Moulton, 251.
8. Plaintiff entitled to rescind may recover the money paid, in assumpsit.
Tender of money that would have been due on completion of the contract is
not essential. Crossyrove v. Himmelrich, 312.
9. If part of consideration is void, contract may be good; aliter if any
part of consideration be illegal. Cobb v. Cowdery, 572.
10. Promise to perform a legal duty no consideration, aliter as to moral
duty. Id.
11. Services in aiding a party in preparation for trial by disclosing names
of witnesses, are good consideration. Id.
12. Written lease may be modified by subsequent parol agreement on new
consideration, and evidence is admissible to show new contract. Flanders v.
F a, 697.
13. Where debt is payable in specific property a new contract made before
the debt is due changing the mode and time of payment needs no new con-
sideration. Thrall v. fead, 832.
14. Not to set up business of making shoe cutters in the state, is illegal,
being in restraint of trade. Taylor v. Blanchard, 58.
CONVERSION. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 22, 29; TROVER.
COPYRIGHT.
1. Under the Act of 1856 an author who has filed a copy of his title-page
but not yet published his play, may have an action at law for damages for the
representation of his play without his consent. Bourcicault v. Wood, 539.
INDEX.
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2. A resident, in the meaning of the Copyright 
Acts, is a person domiciled
in this country, not a mere sojourner. Bourcicault 
v. Wood, 539.
3. In an action for infringement of copyright in a play, 
the copyright and
the fact of representation being established, the burden 
is on defendant to show
the author's consent to the representation. Mere 
publication is not permission
.o perform it. Id.
4. A foreigner, resident in this country, wbo has 
filed a copy of the title-
page of a play, but has not published, is entitled to the 
protection of the Copy-
right Laws, but a subsequent publication in a foreign 
country would be an
abandonment of his rights under the Copyright Act 
of this country. Id.
5. If there has been no publication at all by the author 
of a, play, he has a
right at common law to damages for the representation 
of his play from a
manuscript obtained without his consent. Id.
,1RPORATION. Se CON8TITUTIONAL xW, 8; LANDLORD 
AND TENANT, 3;
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION; RAILROAD COMPANY 
; STAPms, 2.
1. In a suit by a purchaser of stock against the president 
of a corporation
to recover the value of stock fraudulently over-issued 
by him, the plaintiff
must prove that the certificates purchased by him did not 
represent genuine
sitock. ,Rruff v. Mali, 48.
2. The plaintiff having proved that his certificates were 
issued after the
entire stock authorized by law had been taken' and certificates 
issued therefor,
the burden .was then shifted to the defendants to prove that 
plaintiff's stock"
was issued ov te surrender or transfer of genuine stock. 
Id. " - ,
3..Unless this evidence clearly and indisputably establishes 
the genuineness
of plaintiff's stock, the question should be submitted to the jury. 
1d.
4. The authentication of certificates of stock by the president 
of a corpora-
tion by his signature in the usual mode, is equivalent to a 
continuing and
renewed guarantee to successive purchasers, that the stock 
is genuine, and
the plaintiff is not bound to 'prove that he purchased hit 
.certificate directly
from the president or the company. Id. -
5. The directors of a Railroad. Company had power to 
receive subicriptions
for all the untaken stock, and to issue certificates therefor; 
and the moment
this was done the holder became a stockholder, and entitled 
to a stockhiolder's
rights. Curryv. Scott etal., 166.
6. The law authorizes no distinction between the riglts 
b?.one itoekholder
and those of another. If one has not paid his subscription 
"i full he is a
debtor for so much of the subscription as remains unpaid, 
but is none t1e less
A stotkholder. Id.
7. It is not to be admitted that an old stockholder had a'right, 
to subscribe
to the untaken stock, superior to the'rights of one who owned 
no sock. Id.
8. 'An Act of Assembly authorizing the issue of preferred 
stock iid-not Work
a change in the charter untilaccepted by the stockholders, 
but vhen so, accepted
the directors are anthorized to issue the preferred stock. 
Id.
9. The legislature may confer enlarged powers upon 
the managers 7f a
corporation, with the 'assent of shareholders; end 3io one 
stockholder, by
refusing his assent, can hinder the exercise of the enlarged 
powers. Id.
10. Charter foifeited on quo warrant.o and trustee appointed 
to collect assets
and pay debts, surplus belongs to stockholdirs. Lum v. Robertson, 
312.,
11. Delinquent debtor not all6wfd to make technical but.unmeritorious
defence. Id.
12. Snbscribing to stock of incorporated association creates personal liabl.ty
to raise the proper pr9portion of the capital. Mining Co. 
v. Levy, 312.
13. Purchaser from- original subscriber being accepted 
by the corporati~pn
there is privity between the . d.
14. In suit under charter of another state the decisions 
of that state are the
best evidence of tde rights and 
duties of stockholders. Id.
15. Has capacity at common law to.take land in fee. Page 
v. Heine, erq,
697.
16. Statutes of mortmain not adopted in Verinont. Bd.
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17. Railroad company purchased lands in fee and then abandoned for rail-
road purposes, the land did not revert. Page v. Heineberg, 697.
18. Defendant sued by corporation may deny its legal existence. Nat. Bk.
of Metropolis, 59.
19. Action by receiver. Osgood v. Layton, 252.
20. Civil engineer and travelling agent at fixed salary is servant. William-
son v. Wadsworth, 508.
COSTS. See BAwxnuTcy, XI. ; EXECUTION, 3.
COUNTER CLAIM. See SET-OFF.
-COUNTERFEITING. See COURTS, 1.
COUNTY. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 2, 12-14.
COUNTY BONDS. See CounTs, 5.
COUPON. See Bo6, 
1, 2.
COURTS. See BANKRUPTCr, IL; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 18; EQUITY, 2;
MILITARY SERVICE, I.
1. Passing a counterfeit note of a national bank is an offlence for which an
indictment will lie in a state court, under the laws of the state. Jett v.
Commn'th., 260. I
2. There is nothing-in the relations of the state and Federal courts, or in
the nature of the jurisdiction itself, which makes the jurisdiction of the United
States courts to punish the act of passing counterfeit national bank notes,
necessarily exclusive, nor is it made so by Act of Congress. Id
3. The concurrent jurisdiction of the natiofial and state courts considered
and discussed.. Id.
. 4.. Have no jurisdiction on a bill in equity by a state to enjoin the Secre-
tary of War from carrying out an Act of Congrdss, on the ground that such
act will destroy the corporate existence of the state. This is a political, not
a judicial question. Georgia v. Stanton, 441.
5. May issue mandamus to county officer to levy tax to-pay county bonds.
even though a state court has enjoined the officer from so doing. Riggs v.
Johnson Co., 572.
6. May enjoin citizens from proceeding in court of another state. Vail v.
Knapp, 509.'"
COVENANT. See DEED, 8, 9; EASEMENT, 12; EXECUTOR, 8; MINING'"
LEASE; PA&RTY-WAL L, 1.
CRIMINAL LAW. See INTERNAL Rrv mmu, 7. :
I. In general.
1. In a criminal case where insanity is set up as p defence, evidence that a
brother of the accused has become insane from. a cause similar to that which is
claimed to have operated upon the accused, is admissible as having some ten-
dency to prove the hereditary transmission of insane tendencies. People v.
Garbutt, 554.
2. In criminal cases the burden of proof rests upon the prosecution to estab-
lish all the conditions of guilt ; and it does not shift to the prisoner where
insanity is set up as a defence. The jury are to weigh all the evidence, and
unless reasonably satisfied, not only that the prisoner committed the act
charged, but also as to his criminal capacity and intent, their d~uty is to
acquit. Id.
3. It does not follow, however, that the prosecution are required to put in
evidence of sanity before the defence has introduced evidence of the contrary
condition. Sanity being the normal condition of humanity, the prosecution
may rest upon the presumption that it exists, until evidence to rebut that pre-
sumption has been given. Id.
4. Drunkenness is no legal excuse for the commission of crime. Id.
5. Evidence of the good character of a defendant is always admissible'iu a
criminal case, and when put in, the jury have a right to give it such weight at
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they think it fairly entitled to. Arbitrary rules for this purpose cannot te
laid down for their control. In some cases an unblemished good character
may not only raise a doubt as against the clearest case upon the other evi-
dence, but may even bring conviction of innocence. People v. Garbutt, 554.
6. Warrant of arrest need only recite th6 accusation, not the evidence.
Pratt v. Bogardus, 378.
7. Magistrate is protected in issuing if there is c6lorable evidence. Id.
8. If person is as well known by the name in the indictment as by the one
pleaded, the indictment is good. State v. Dresser, 445.
9. Where accused does not testify, though allowed by the laws of the state
to do so, this fact cannot be used as an argument against him. State v. Care-
eron; 831.
10. On trial of husband for attempt to poisostwife, the latter is competent
witness. People v. Northrup, 636.
IT. Bigamy. See HUSi3AND AND Wirz, 2.
111. Counterfeiting National Bank Notes. See CouRTs, 1.
IV. Larceny.
. 11. A building on a market garden, used for storing tools, manure, and
seeds, is not a warehouse within the N. H. statute.. tate v. Wilson, 252.
12. Taking several tkhings at one time only one offence. State v. Cameron,
831.
13. Evidence on indietment for. Id.
CROPPER. See LANDLORD AND TENANT, 2.
CURRENCY. See CoIN.
CURTESY. See HUSAND A D WxF, Ir.
CUSTO)M.. See (oxx, 1; INSURANO, 2.
1. Requisites of valid custom to affect contracts' Sipperly v. Stewart, 639.
2 Of attorneys to give directions to sheriff not admissible to prove that the
attorney jave such directions in a particular case. ine . Pomeroy, 697.
DAM., See EQUITY, 9.
. Owner may dig canal on his own land to preventits being flowed by a dam
below. Storm v. Mau.ciaug Co., 126.
DAMAGES. See CoIN, 2; CoM xo CARRIER, 17, 18 MININGLmEsE, 2; Os-
NICE, 7; RAILROAD, 15, 18; VENDOR AND PURoHAsE, 9.
1. While those damages which depend on the sound discretion of a jury are
mot susceptible of any accurate regulation by the court, yet the jury should be
prevented from acting upon improper theories as to the legitimate elements to
be considered in estimating them. Daily Post Co. v. McArthur, 482. " •
2. The term "exemplary or vindictive damages," should no: be -used with-
out. such explanation as may prevent a jury from being misled by it.' For
voluntary wrongs additional damages are allowed for injuie.d feeling, butSnothin~g beyond the individual grievance should, be taken in, amcount in esti-
mating them. Id.
3. If different ageficies have concurred in producihg a private grievance,
the liability of each person for such portion of the damages as is allowed for
Injured feeling should be measured by the extent of his own misconduct. Id.
4. While the mischief which may be caused by an a"use of the ptessis such
is to render its conductors responsible for great care in guarding against the
danger, yet thk necessities of civilization require thbino-unreasouable or vex-
atios restrictions shall be imposed upon it. Ad. ." -
5. The character and doings of -private persons, not developed in, legal pro-
ceedings or voluntarily made public, cannot properly be discsel in prixit;
and for all libels, every piblisher, whether an -individual- or a corperatibn, is
vesnonsibler to the extent of any special damage, and any estilmted damage to
credit and reputation. But ,be is only liable for such damages to injured feel-
ing'as must inevitably be inferred from the libel .itself, published in a paper
of such character and circulation as his, if he has used such precautions as he
reasonably could, to prevent such an abuse of his columns. Id.-
VOL. XVI.-54,
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6. The employment of competent editors, the supervision by proper persons
of all that is to be inserted, and the establishment and habitual enforcement
of such rules as would probably exclude improper items, should exempt a pub-
lisher from any aggravation of damages on account of the express malice of
his subordinate, for any libel published without his privity or approval. Dailj
Post Co. v. McArthur, 462.
7. But if it should appear that he was wanting in reasonable care to pre-
vent abuses, he would be liable to increased damages for his own misconduct,
which might fairly be regarded as identifying him with faults which he took
no pains to suppress. Id.
8. Vendor interfered with vendee's building by injunction which was after-
wards dissolved. Vendee having sold the land was not entitled to recover on
the injunction bond damages for difference of cost in building between time
when injunction issued and when -dissolved. Morgan v. NegleV, 59.
9. For breach of promise of marriage. Harrison v. Swift, 57.
10. For breach of contrgct to pay is the amount that would have been re-
ceived. Wicker v. Hoppuck, 377.
11. Agreement binding maker in "full and liquidated sum of $1000, over
and above actual damages," &c.,is for liquidated damages. Dwinel v. Brown,
.441.
DEAN, AMOS. 257.
DEBT. See LEGAL TENDER NOTES.
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR. See BANKRUPTCY; DEED, 4; GUARDIAN, 1;
MORTGAGE; PARTNERSHIP, 4, 6.
I. Sale or Conveyance fraudulent as to Creditors.
1. Other creditors may come in as parties to creditor's bill. Meyers v.,
Fenn, 59.
2. Partner in firm about to fail may use his private estate to pay private
creditors, and conveyance to private creditor of his real estate is not to be
presumed fraudulent. Bank v. Fitch, 59.
3. In: suit in equity against debtor and debtor's wife to reach property
fraudulently conveyed to wife to defraud husband's creditors, plaintiff may
take deposition of wife though there has been no service on the husband who
is out of the country. Crompton v. Anthony, 186.
-4. Debtor in failing circumstances cannot even for valuable consideration
convey his land reserving a right to occupy it for a time for his own benefit..
Lukins v. Aird, 313.
5. Conveyance without consideration to defraud creditors void against sub-
sequent as well as prior creditors. Marston v. Afarstott, 443.
6. Purchaser from insolvent debtor with knowledge of intention to defraud
particular creditor is liable for such part of the purchase-money as the debtor
has diverted from his creditors. Clements v. Moore, 378.
IL Tender and Payment.
7. Plaintiff having traversed plea of tender cannot except to right to file
such plea. Carpenter v. Welch, 638.
8. If tender is received although made after the proper time, it operates as
a payment as of the proper time. .d.
9. Order by debtor to his agent having funds, to pay creditor, is appropri-
ation of the amount.. Goodwin v. Bowden, 439.
10. Agent's promise toexecute the order is an original undertaking. Td.
11. Delivery of money by debtor with specific instructions as to its applica-
tion. Violation of instructions by creditor. Norton v. Kidder, 447.
12. Charges of converting security into money are to be deducted before
application to payment. S/Wdon v. Raveret, 379.
13. Especially if creditor is a factor with lien on goods. Id.
DEED. See EQUITY, 5-7; ESTATE TAIL; Husneu AND WIFE, 12, 25.
J. Delivery.
I. Mere recording without knowledge of or delivery to grantee is not legal
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delivery and subsequent ratification by grantee will not cut out an intervening
mortgage for value. Parmelee v. Simpson, 60.
2. Delivery to agent of grantor with orders to deliver it presently to grantee
passes title at once. Ernst v. Reed; 573.
3. Delivery to third person by direction of grantee is sufficient. Hatch v.
Bates, 442.
4. None but creditor of grantor cannot object to want of consideration. Id.
II. Construction and what passes by. See VENDOR, 11.'
- 5. Construction where premises and habendum are repugnant. Fagg v.
Bames, 573.
6. For lot 120 ft. including stable, &c., not reformed so as to include stable
which in fact was on another lot. White v. Williams, 187.
7. Reservation of use and occupancy for stated period by grantor not deter-
mined by leasing of part unless reservation is 'strictly personal. Cooney v.
Bayes, 762.
8. Acceptance by grantee of deed with covenant as to manner of building
is equivalent to express covenant by him, and affects the title of his grantees.
Dock Co. v. Leavitt, 636.
'9. Covenant not to erect distillery broken by erection of machinery and
building that migh be used as such though now use'd for other purpose. Id.
10. For strip of land for private road. Kilmer v. Wilson, 379.
11. Sale of lots on street by metes and bounds, according to a plan. War-
ren v. Blake, 442.
12. Timber trees cut down, but lying on the ground, will pass 1y eeed of
the land. Brackett v. Goddard, 442.
DELIVERY. See DEED, 1-3 ; ESTATE TAIL; FRAUDs, STATUTE OF, 5 ; VAXt-
- DOR AND lURciHASER, 15-20.
DESERTER. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 9, 10; MILITARY SzRvcO, 2.
DISTILLERY See DEED, 9 ; INTERNAL RnvENUE, 1-3.° -
DIVORCE. See HUSBAND AND WIPE, I.-
DONATIO MORTIS CAUSA. See HUSBAND AND WIF, 26.
DOWER. See HUSBAND AND WiE, II.
DRUNKENNESS. See CRuimwr LAw, 4; HUsBAND A14D WIFE, 5; LurA-
TIC, 1.
ICASEMENT. See MERGER; WAY. .
1. There may be a dedication of land to public use bypaiol ; but the intent
to dedicate should in such case be clearly shown. Morrison v.-MarguardA er
al., 336.
2. The'English doctrine that there may be A grant of light and air by impli-
cation is not applicable to the situation and condition of this country. Id. .
3. The English rule is this: If a man sells a house with windows and doors
opening on to his vacant ground, neither he nor his grantee can afterwards
build upon such vacant ground so as to obstruct thb flow 9f light and air with-
out express reservation of the right to do so: Hdd, that if such a rule should
be recognisedL in this country, it should be applied only in cases where the
circumstances make it clear that such must have been the intention of the
parties. Id.
4. In this case the circumstances negatived such intention. Id.
5. It is settled law that there is no implied reservation of a right to light and
air. So that if one sells vacant land and retains the house adjoining, the pu;-
chaser of the vacant land may build thereon, though he darken thereby the
w'indows of the house of his vendor. Id..
6. The owner. of the servient estate cannot by the unlawful destretion of
an easement extinguish the right of the owner of the dominant estate thereto ;
and the latter owner may, in proper cases, have relief in equity, and not be
driven to an action for damages. Pd.
7. Cannot exist in parol. Huffv. McCauley, 63
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8. Contract to allow A. to take coal from B.'s land is a projzt a prendre,
and must be created by grant or pres@ription. Huff v. McCauley, 63.
9. Grant of surface right "1 only for the purpose of a coal-breaker," &c., is
an easement only. Big Mt. Co.'s Appeal, 313.
10. If owner of adjoining closes, over one of which a way exists for benefit
of the other, conveys them simultaneously.to different persons, the right of
the way does not pass as an easement unless it be of strict necessity. Warrer
v. Blake, 442.
11. Not created or continued by severance of estate unless from necessity
Fetters v. Humphreys, 698.
12. Paity having easement claimed over his land may interrupt it, and, if
sued and damages recovered against him, may sue his grantor on covenant
against incumbrances. Smith v. Sprague, 573.
ELECTIONS. See Oi'Ino, 5, 6.
1. Under a statute "to regulate the election of state and county officers,"
after the polls of an electi6n have been once opened "between the hours of
'six and ten in the morning" in pursuance thereto, they cannot be "closed"
for any purpose until six o'clock in the afternoon, without rendering the elec-
tion illegal and void. State v. Bitt, 88.
2. For what causes an election will'be held void. Note to State r. Ritt, 91.
EMINENT DOMAIN. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAw, 17-19.
ENGLISH LAINGUAGE. See PARTNERSHrP, 11.
Signs of degrees and minutes not part of. "Statey. ,ericho, 762.
ENLISTMENT. See BONTY, 1; MILITARY SERVICE.
EQUITY. See APPRENTICE, 2; BANRUPTOY, 15 ; CouBTs, 4; DEBTOR AND
CREDITOR, 1; EASEMENT, 6; EVIDENCE, 4;- EXECUTION, 1; HUSBAND
AND WxrFE, 16; INTERNATIONA'L LAW, 2; NuISANcE. 4-7; SET-Opp.
1. Plain defect of jurisdiction will prevent a decree at any time. T7omp-
sony. B. B. Co., 314.
2. The abolishing by states of the distinction between law and equity will
not change the practice of the United States courts. Id.
3. Absence of plain and adequate remedy at law'the test of jurisdiction.
Watson v. Sutwjland, 61.
4. Answer tio bill not complete until filed, and death of party prevents filing.
Giles v. Eaton, 443.
5. Where a person boukht and took possession of a house under a forged
deed, the true owner is entitled, on a bill in qxiity, to have the deed and the
record of it declared void, and the deed dlivered up to be cancelled, and the
purchaser enjoined from assuming to sell the house to any one else. Bunce v.
Gallagher, 32.
6. It is not necessary that the title of the plaintiff should be established and
possession obtained by an action at law. Rd.
7. The owner having in the trial of his complaint given the forged deed in
evidence, is entitled to prove the forgery.- Id.
8. Where the holder of the legal title is a plaintiff, the misjoinder of other
paities having an equitable interest will be disregarded unless the objection be
taken by demurrer or answer before answer on the merit. Id.
9. Bill lies to ascertain height to which owner of dam is entitled to flow
back water. Carlisle v. Cooper, 698.
10. Court will not order an issue if evidence is satisfactory. Id.
11. Suitor cannot be compelled to elect between suit in equity to prevent
future injury and suit pending in law for damages for past, nor will the suit in
equity be delayed until the determination of the action at law, which is for a
different object. Ad.
12. Object of preliminary injunction is to preserve the status quo, not to
transfer property from one to another. Farmers' Co. v. Beno, 4-c., 121.
13. When court will interfere by injunction with proceedings in a lower
court. Ewing v. St. Louis, 121.
14. By the chancery practice of Vermont, where' an injunction is awarded
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and the complainant takes out a subpcena returnable to the next term of the
court, but neglects to get it served in time, the injunction is not thereby dis-
solved, but a new subpoena may be issued returnable to the next succeeding
term. Howe v. Eddy, 219.
15. The respondent may, however, come in at any time, and apply for an
order to have the subpoena and bill served on him in order to allow him to
answer, or he may move to dissolve the injunction on account of the com-
plainant's delay, or invoke any other action of the court necessary to protect
his rights. Id.
ESTATE BY ENTIRETIES. See HUsBAND AND WIFE, 21.
ESTATE FOR LIFE. See ESTATm TAIL.
ESTATE TAIL.
A. made a deed by which he granted certain lands to his daughter B.
"during her lifetime, and to her eldest son, which shall be living at her de-
cease, and to his eldest son at his decease, and so on from eldest son to eldest
son to the latest generation," habendum to B. "and to her heirs as aforesaid."
This deed he never delivered, but after his death it was found in his papers
and delivered by his administrator to B., who went into possession under it,
and afterwards made a deed in fee for the same premises to C., who held by
himself and his grantees in fee for thirty-six years. Held,
1. That B. took a life estate only.
2. That tier eldest son living at her decease took a fee tail directly from
the original grantor.
3. That the only title B. took and conveyed and#C. took and held under
B. was under -color of the deed from A., and therefore both B. and C. and
the subsequent purchasers under them were estopped from disputing the va-
lidity of .A.'s deed, because it was not- delivered in the lifetime'of the
grantor..
4. That C. took with notice of the title of B.'s eldest'son, and his pos-
session was not adverse so long av B.'lived.
5. That the deed from A. to B. being'on record, was notice to all subse-
quent purchasers of the extent of B.'s title.- Ford v. Fint et al., 296.
ESTOPPEL. See ACCOUNT STATED; BA~zavFTrn , 30; EsTATz TAIL; Li-
CENSE, 1 ; RAIL-ROAD, 17.
Party disclaiming ownership to administrator not estopped by the lattdr's
putting the property in his inventory and having it appraised. Turner -.
Waldo, 573. - . I
EVIDENCE. See ACTION, 2; AssvMsrr, 1; ConroBATioN, 1-3, 14; Cm3.a
NAL LA-w 1--8; EQUITY, 7; HuSliND AND WIFE, 1; INSuRAIcu, 1, 2,
16; MILITAR SxAyICE, 2; RAILROAD, IS..17, 22; STAmPS,. 3, 4; WIT-
NESS.
1. C&NVIOTIOrN UPON CIRCUMSTANTIeAL "EvIDENcE, 705.
2. If no objection made or exception taken at trial ourt will not reverse
for admission of incompetent. Voorlsv. Voorhis, 637..
3. Introduction of evidence not strictly legal to rebut impression produced
by other evidence that should not have been admitted. Lytle v. Bond, 829.
4. Party may explain how he understood an'oath to a bill in chancery.
Whitcher v. Morey, 187. -
5. Copy of minutes of evidence of.Aceased witness may be read. 1d.
6. Where date of note is so badlywritten that the judge cannot read it; evi-
dence is admissible to show the true date, and this is for the jury. Fenderso?
v. Owen, 443. • .• -
7. When specimens of handwriting, admitted or proved to be. genuine, are
offered to prove by comparison the genuineness of the writing in issue, the
comparison can only he made by the jury. Haycock v. Greup, 529.
8. Such evidence is competent only as corroborative of other proof; it is
not admissible as independent proof. Id. -
9. On an issue to determine the genuineness of a signature of A., specimens
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of B.'s writing in which the name of A. occurs are not competent indepcndent
evidence to prove by'comparison that the signature of A. was written by B.
Nor is the opinion of a witness that the signature was not written by A. any
foundation for such proof that it was written by B. Haycock v. Greup, 529.
10. Whether such testimony would be competent even in corroboration of
other testimony that R. had written the signature in issue, doubted. Id.
EXECUTION. See HEo STEAD; REMAINDER.
1. Goods sold on process and purchaser pays the- money to the creditor,
sheriff may have bill in equity against creditor for his claim. Barkei v. Bar-
ker, 253.
2. Officer may deduct expenses of keeping and selling goods before apply-
ing balance to satisfaction of the execution. Baldwin v. Hatch, 446.
3. Officer not bound by taxation of his fees in suit to which he is not party,
but aliter as to party. Id.
EXECUTORS AND i1DfNfSTRATORS. See ESTOPPEP.
' ' 1. An administrator may sue for breach of contract made with his intestate,
although the bIeach occurred after death of the decedent and before grant 3f
letters of administration. Holcomb v. Roberts, 474.
2. In cases where it is necessary for the purpose of supporting the rights of
the intestate and for thq benefit of his estate, letters of administration relate
back to the death oF-the intestate. Id.
3. Allowance of claim in another state under ancillary administration not
conclusive. Ela v. Edwards, 187.
4. Letters testamentary in another state give no authority. Gilman v. Gil-
man, 443.
5. Executor de son. tort-what he may be allowed. Tobey v. Miller, 443-
-6. If executor mingles his trust money with his own and dies, no preference
will be allowed in the distribution of his estate. Barlow v. Yeomans, 637.
7. Court has power to order sufficient assets to be set aside for the discharge
of a debt or duty to be paid by testator or his executor at a future day. Petrie
v. Voorhees, 696.
8. In geniral bound by all covenants of testator except t1jose to be performed
by him in -person. Id.
EXPRESS COMPANY. See Commow CARRIER; REPLEViX, 4.
FACTOR. See DEBTOR AND. CREDITOR, 13.
FALSE REPRESENTATIONS. See VENDOR; 12, 14.
Party liable for not speaking truthfully as to solvency of another, though
he might have declined to speak at all. liele v. Coss, 380.
FIXTURES.
1. General rule as to what are. Hoyle v. It. . Co., 762.
2. Double window frames and blinds not fastened in but held merely by
being fitted close are not fixtures. Peck v. Batchelder, 637.
FORFEITURE. See INTERNA-L RnvzxuE, 1-3.
FORMER ACTION. See CONTRACT, 1, 2; PARTNERSHIP, 2.
FRANCE, TRIBUNALS An ADmnISTRATION OF JUSTICE IN, I.
FRAUD. See BANKRuPTCy, MI, 34, 42-7, 55, 73; DEBTOR AND CREDITOR,
I; MORTGAGE; TR.ADEMARK; VENDOR, 22.
FRAUDS, STATUTE OF. See TRUST, 2,3; VENDOR, 16.
1. Verbal agr'eemeut to convey land followed by payment of purchase.
money passes no title, nor even license to enter. Whitcher v. Morey, 188.
2. Acceptance of bill of goods in a warehouse in another state with order
on warehouseman will not take the sale out of the statute. Boardman v.
Spooner, 188.
3. Name stamped on the bill with a press not sufficient of itself to consti
tute a memorandum in writing. Id.
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4. Receipt by mail, by purchaser, of a bill of goods with terms, &c., will
not take the purchase out of the statute. Pike v. Wieting, 508.
5. Verbal contract of sale of 1900 bushels of potatoes is taken out of sta-
tute by delivery of one load though defendant -had previously written to plain-
tiff not to purchase any more for him. Danforth v. Walker, 635.
6. But plaintiff had no right after receiving the letter to purchase more and
recover for loss by frost or rot. Id.
GOLD. See COIN.
GUARDIAN. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 23.
1. Deed to A., his heirs and assigns, with acknowledgment of receipt of the
purchase-money from A., guardian, &c., is notice to A.'s creditors that the
land is held in trust. Bancroft v. Consen, 121.'
2. If a guardian wrongfully invest the trust-money in land in his own
name, it will not be liable for his debts. Id.
GUARANTY. See .ARBITRATION, 1; CORPORATION, 4; DEBTOR AND CRE-
DITOR, 10.
HABEAS CORPUS. See BAInEUPTcyC, 18'; INFANT, 1; MILITARY S.RVICE, 1.
HANDWRITING. See BILLS AND NOTES, 2, 10; EVIDENCE, 6-10.
HIGHWAY. See MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 8-10; NUISANCE, 11 *Riv', 1-3..
1. Any object in or near a highway which would necessarily obstruct one in
its use for the purpose of travelling thereon, or which would be likely to pro-
duce that efibct, will constitute a defect in the highway. Rewisdn v. New
Haven, 777.
*2. But those objects which have no necessary connection with the road-bed
or relation to the public travel thereon, and the danger from which arises from
mere casual proximity and not from the use of the road for the purpose. of
travelling thereon, will not, as a general rule, render the road defective. Id.
3. Where a flag was suspended by private individuals across a public street
with iron weights at the lower corners and one of the weights became detached
and fell upon a traveller on the highway who was in the exercise of reasonable
care, it was held, that the city was not liable for the injury under the duty im-
posed upon it by law to keep the street "in good and sufficient repair." Id.
4. An allegatiou of duty without stating the facts which raise the duty, is
insufficient ; and if the facts stated do not raise the duty alleged, the allegation
of duty is immaterial. Id.
5. An object which is not an obstruction apd with which travellers do not
come .in collision is not a defect, though it be of a nature to frighten horses.
Kingsbury v. Dedham, 61.
6; Owner of land adjoining may stop drainage of water from highway, on
to his land. Franklin v. Isk, 61.
7. Pent road is highwayv though not an open one. Walcot.v. Whltcomb,
574.
"HOMESTEAD.
Right of redemption not subject to execution when value under $500.
Tucker v. Kenniston, 253. 1
HUSBAND AND WIFE. See NEGLIGENCE, 5, TNANT IN CO ON, 3.
I. .Marriage and Divorce.
1. Marriage is a civil contract not requiring anyparticular form of solemni-
zation, and may be proved by cohabitation and reputation. Comra'th. v.
Stump, 61. ..
2: To constitute the crime of bigamy, there must be a valid marriagQ pub-
sisting at the time of the second marriage. McReynolds V. The Stati, 736.
3. A marriage between slaves was, in legal contemplation, absolutel3 void;
but if the parties, after their manumission, continued to cohabit together as
husband and wife, it was a legal assent and ratification ofithe marriage; and
if while such marriage exists, one of the parties-marries another, it is bigamy.
Id.
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4. Courts cannot divorce parties not married in the state, nor residents.
Calef v. Calef, 443.
5. Divorej in Michigan for habitual drunkenness does not extend to case
where the same cause existed at marriage. Porrett v. Porrett, 189.
6. State prison in the Divorce Act of N. H. means the state prison "of that
state only. Martin v. Martin, 253.
7. Jurisdiction of Supreme Court of New York is entirely statutory, and
does not extend to declare a marriage void because one of the parties was pre-
viously divorced for a cause that made a second marriage illegal, and went to
iaother state to be married the second time. Penuet v. Phelps, 124.
g. Husband's consent bars his action for crim.,con. Bunnell v. Greathea'l
313.
9. Negligence on his part goes to reduce damages. Id.
-11. Curtesy, Dower and Aarriage'Seitlement. .
10. Married Woman's Act of N.J. has abolished tenancy by curtesy initiate.
but not curtesy consummate: Porch v. 1Wes, 699.
. . 11. Tenant by curtesy may not commit waste by cutting timber, and timber
severed will retiin its character as realty, and heirs may have account for
what is taken away and injunction on removal of remainder. Id.. 12. The Illinois tatute giving a married womin exclusive control of her
property does not give to her the power of conveying her real estate without
the consent of her husband manifested by joining in the deed. Cole v. Van
Riper, 478.
13. Although the staiute abolishes the life &state of the husband in his wife's
lands, during their joint lives, it does not abolish the tenancy by the curtesy
after the wife's death. Id.
14. LIABInLXY op DowREss ron TAXEs ASSESSED DURING THE HUS-
E3ADis Li p, 385.
15. An ante-nuptial contract between husband and wife, in respect to the
disposition and enjoyment of their respective estates, is one in which both par-
ties should exhibit the utmost good faith; and any designed and material con-
cealment ought to avoid the contract at the will of the injured party. Kline
v. Kline; 713. .
16. Marriage settlement conveying property to which wife might become
entitled does not pass after acquired property, and equity will not enforce it is
an agreement i5 convey unless such be the plain intent of the parties. Stein-
berber v. Potter, 762.
!M. Separate Estate of Wife. and Estate by Entireties.
17. A trust created before the Act of 1848 to protect a married woman's
property from her husband, to determine in case she survives him, is deter-
mined by a divorce a vinculo. Koenig v. Smith, 717.
18. Husband of infant cannot sell growing timber.on her land. Porch v.
.l'es, 699.
19. Covenant by husband to stand seised to the uie of himself during 'ife
and then to the use of his wife during her life, vests the estate in her after nis
death. Leavitt v. Leavitt, 253.
20. The administrator of the husband is not entitled to dispossess the wife
by showing a decree of insolvency. The covenant to stand seised may be good
notwithstanding, if made in good faith and the husband was not then insolvent.
Id.
21. Estate by entireties is not destroyed by the Acts of N. Y.allowing mar
ried women to hold their property separate. F. 4- M. Bank v. Gregory, 121
22. Where such estate is voluntarily converted into money it belongs to the
husband and becomes liable to his creditors. Id.
IV. Powers of Married Woman. See ante, 12.
23. Power of guardian over infant ceases at marriage. Porch v. lHWes, 699.
24. Acknowledgmefit by married infant void. Id.
25. A deed of her separate estate without her husband joining, is void.
Dean and Wife v. O'Meara, 229.
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26. Married woman may make donation mortis causa in Mass. without hus-
band's consent. Marshall v. Berry, 121.
27. Married woman liable on her note given for cattle to stock farm for het
separate use. Batchelder v. Sargent, 
253.
V. Actions by and against Husband and Wife. See CrmiNAL IAw, 10;
DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, 3.
28. Husband and wife should join in writ of entry for land conveyed to
them for their lives. Wentworth v. Remick, 254.
" 29. Su. . lies in N. Y. by wife against husband for conversion of her sepa-
rate estate. Whitney v. Whitney, 508.
30. Admissions of marriage by plaintiff evidence to support plea for non-
joinder of husband. Laughlin v. Eaton, 443. •
31. Married woman cannot sue alone though her husband has been away for
several years. Id.
- - 32. Wife may be compelled to be witness as to matters affecting only her
own interests. Kinney v. Metler, 699.
INDICTMENT. See CImINAL .;Iw.
INFANT. See HUSBAND AND WIF , 18, 23, 24.
1. Custody of belongs to father, but court will Iiot of course on habeas cor-
pus order them delivered to him. The office of the writ is not to obtain pos-
session of the person, but to free it from illegal restraint. State v. Baird, 700.
2. Where children are too young to exercise discretion court will do it for
them. Id.
INJUNCTION. See EQUITY, 5, 11-15 ; NuisNcE, 4-8; TnRsPAss, 1.
INNKEEPER.
May furnish liquor to his own household as any other head of a family. State
v. ones, 189.
INSANITY. "See CRIMINAL Liw, 1-3; INsURANCE, 4; LTAvo; WILL, 1-4;
INSOLVENT. See BAKRUTcY; DhBTOR AND CRzDITOR, . ; HUSBAND AND
WIFE, 20 ; STAmiS, 4 ; VENDOR, 22.
INSURANCE SeeAGBNT, 3.
1. In a suit brought in assumpsit for breach of a contract between an insur-
ance agent and his company, by which it was agreed thitt he should receive a
percentage on all renewals of policies procured by him as long as such policies
remain in force: Held, that the action may be sustained as upon a contract
indivisible, and testimony will be admitted to show the probabl6 expectancy
of the duration of such policies. Ensworth v. New York Co., 332.
2.. A custom amohg insurance companies as to an agent's property in poli-
cies prochred by him may be introduced to explain such contract. 1d.
3. By trustee .to9 whom cestui que trust is indebted, for benefit of trustee's
creditor. Ins. o. v. Chase, 122-
4. Condition in life policy as to suicide does not- include suicide during
insanity Lasterbrook v. Ins. Co., 445.
5. Trustees of railroad company insuring all property belonging to said
company cover a dredge boat belonging to company attached to wharf at rail-
road terminus. Farmers', 4-c., Co. v. Ins. Co., 763.
6. When a steamer is insured, while navigating the Western rivers, there
is a warranty implied that the subject insured is a vessel of this description,
and will continue so during the existence of the jolicy. - Baker v. Central Ins.
Co., 628. "
7. If the owners subsequently transfer the machinery and wheels.qf the bbat
to another vessel, with the intention to abandon the hull for all purposes of
navigation, the hull is no longer at the risk of the underwriter; Id.
8. In time policies the mere intention to deviate does not avoid the policy.
Beams v. Ins. Co., 254.
9. Specific and floating policies-division of-loss between. Merrick v. Ins
Co., 314.
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10. Taking by confederate vessel of war'was a capture within the warranty
of the policy. Mauran v. Ins. Co., 444.
11. Insurers must pay for temporary as well as permanent repairs, where
made by their consent and for their benefit. Alexandre v. Ins. Co., 574.
12. Clause that no action shall be maintained without previous reference to
arbitration void. Stephenson v. Ins. Co., 444.
13. Construction of policy. Id.
14." In case of sale by master from necessity, the salvage belongs to insurers.
Id.
15. Master's authority rests entirely on necessity, and burden of proof is on
the assured. Id.
16. Alleged copy 2 f survey ndt made by 9rder of a Court of 'Admiralty or
under oath not evidence though certified by American consul. Id.
INTEREST.
1. Where a sum is left by will in trust, with a direction that the interest
and income shall be applied to the use of a person, such person is entitled to
the interest from the date of testator's death. Cook v. Meeke&, 112.
2. Especially is this so where it appears to have been the intent of the tes-
tator that the legacy should be paid by's transfer of bonds bearing interest at
the time of his death. " Id.
3. Allowed on unliquidated demands which could be ascertained by compu-
tation and reference to established market values. - Sipperly v. Stewart, 637.
4. In computing with rests the first rest is to be made at end of one year
from commencement of account. Carpenter v. Welsh, 638.
INTERNAL REVENVUE. See STAm-.. 1.' The words "personal property" in the 48th section of the Internal Reve-
nue Act of 1864, as amended by the Act of 1866, do not include all the per-
sonal property found in the same building where the still and illicitly-distilled
spirits were found, and in the possession, custody, and control of the same
person who had control thereof, but must be confined to the tools, implements,
and instruments that had been or could be used in connection with the distila-
-tiou of spirits in the building. United States v. Thirty-Three Barrds, 365.
2. The words "personal property" in section 48 of the Internal Revenue
Aet, forfeiting property used in illicit distilling, include all the property in
the building where the still or spirits ave fouid, whether of a nature.to be used
in the distillation of spirits or not. United States v. Quantity of Bags, etc.,
369.
3. What may be considered within the same luilding, yard, or enclosure.Id.
4. A claimant may take advantage of the limitation of section 68 of the
Internal Revenue Act of 1864, under an answer of general denial. United
States v. Six Fermenting Tubs, 751..
5. The Act of 1866, repealing the 68th section of the Internal Revenue
Act, continues the section as to offences against the Revenue Laws committed
before the repeal. Id.
6. License is only a mode of taxation and does not give any authority to
carry on business contrary to the laws of a state. Lieense Tax Cases, 123.
7. Such license is no bar to indictment under state law. Pervear v.
Commn'th, 123.
.NTERNATIONAL LAW.
1. During a war contracts between citizens of the opposing belligerents are
bompletely suspended, and cannot be enforced even by a proceeding in rem.
Connecticut Ins. Co. v. Hall, 606.
2. Therefore a mortgagee of land in Illinois could not sue out his mortgage
while the mortgagor was a citizen of Louisiana, which was in insurrection.
and a decree of foreclosure made under such circumstances was opened by a
court of equity, although the statutory period for redemption had passed. Id.
3. Belligerent cannot blockade mouth of river occupied on one bank by
neutrals with right of navigation. The Peterhoff, 62.
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4. Vessel from one neutral port to another does not violate blockade, though
the ultimate destination of the cargo be to the enemy. The Peterhoel, 62.
5. Articles contraband of war intended for a belligerent are always liable
to seizure. IM.
6. Classification of goods as contraband. Id.
7. Neutral merchant vessel carrying mail is not privileged by that fact from
examination, and has a special duty of frankness an& respect for belligerent
rights. Id.
INTOXICATING LIQUORS. See INnEEER; VENDOR AND PURCHASER, 21.
JOINDER. See ARBITRATIOIN, I; EQUITY, S.
Of complaints for contract and tort in N. Y., 1ynn v. Baitey, 638.
JOINT DEBTORS. See BILLS AND NOTES, 9.
I. Separate settlement by one need not refer to the statute. Holdrege v.
Bank, 189.
2. Payment by one under agreement by the other to remain liable does not
stop the Statute of Limititions from running in favor of the latter. Sigler v.
Ilatt, 189.
JOINT OWNERS. See NEGLIGENCE, 2.
JUDGMENT. See Bexx urvcy, 13, 14, 20; CONTRACT, 1.
JURY. See NE W TRIAL, 2-4 ; VERDICT.
LACHES. See*ADminALTY, 8.
,1ANDLORD AND TENANT. See BtaNKRuPTo, 57-60; MINi G LEASE;
TnovER, 4.
1. Lessee of land sold under execution against landlord, is not tenant at
will to purchaser until notice. Adams v. McKesson, 63.
1 2. One hired to work land and take part of the produce -for payis a cropper,
not a tenntit. id.
3. Where A. takes lease in trust for. corporation to be formed, and corpora-
tion receives an assignment of the lease .with ihe knowledge of the facts, it
becomes liable for rent. Van Schich v. R. -R Co., 574.
4. Lease for' years, with perpetual right of rene.wal, does not pass fee.
Page v. Psty, 445.15. Conveyance by lessor makes.grantee landlord, and surrender to original
lessor gives him nor interest. I'd.
6.' Right of tenant to occupy by himself or assignees, unless restrained by
express clause bf lease. Cooney- v. Hayes, 763.
7. Landlord entering peaceably in absence of tenant and on. claim of right
by expiration oftemancy, tenant cannot forcibly dislodge him. Sage v. Har-
pending,*314.
8. Practice in.sqummary proceedings for removal of tenant in7N.Y. People
v. Teed, 254. , •,
LARCENY. See CRIMINAL LAw, IV.
LEASE. See CONTRACT, 12; LANDLORD AND TkNALT; MINING LEASE
,
LEGACY. See INTEREST, 1.
LEGAL TENDER NOTES. See Con, 2. "
Railroad fare, even when demanded in advance, is so far a debt that it is
payable in legal tender notes. Lewis v. R. B. Co, 511.
LEGISLATURE. See CONST.ITUTIONAL LAW, 1T..
LETTER. See CONTRACT, 4, 5.
LIBEL. See DAMAGES. 5-7.
1. Where words are susceptible of any innocent interpretation an innuendo is
required, as e. g. that a prostitute is under the protection of plaintiff. More v.
Bennett, 190.
2. Words not actionable are not enlarged by innuendo. "Carry the plaintiff
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back to Thomaston, where he came from," with innuendo mat; ;homast.s
meant the state prison, not libellous. Emery v. Prescott, 445.
LICENSE. See INTERNAL REVENUE, 6, 7 ; WAY, 1.
1. To be irrevocable must be by estoppel, because parties cannot be put in.
statu quo. Huff v. McCauley, 63.
2. Mere payment of money for a license will not make it irrevocable. Id.
LIEN. See ADMIRALTY, 1, 2; BAMEaUtTCY, 15, 16, 31-33.
LIFE ESTATE. See ESTATE TAIL.
LIMITATIONS. See AcCOUNT STATED; BANKRUPTCY, 62-66; JoINT DEBT-
ORB, 2.
1. Suit is commenced when the writ is ready with intention of immediate
service. Mason v. Cheney, 315.
2. How the affixing of a stamp affects the writ. Id.
3. Partial payment appropriated to whole account will stop the statute,
D'er v. Walker, 445. -
4. Where debt is-payable oni demand statute does not usually begin to run
until demand, but creditor by unreasonable delay may put the statute in ope-
ration without demand. 7Trall v. Mead, 832.
LIQUIDATED DAMAGES. See DAMAGES, 11; MINING LEAsO, 2.
LUNATIC. See WILL, 1-4.
1. Inquisition changes the presumption in favor of sanity, and casts onus-
on party setting up a, contract, but mere proof of habitual intemperance apart
from finding by inquisition is not enough for that purpose. Nod v. Karper,
123.
2. Chancery.will grant second inquisition if ground is laid. Matter of Col-
lins, 700.
' 3. Imbecility for which commission will issue must amount to unsoundness
of mind, and there is no presumption against the mind of a person one hun-
dred years of age. Id.
MAIL See CONTRACT, 5; INTERNATIONAL LAw, 7.
MANDAMUS. See COURTS, 5.
1. Granting or refusing is discretionary. People v. Croton Aqueduct
Board, 509...
2. Matter of discretion. Party asking must have a right not only to'a de-
cision but to the thing claimed. People v. Booth, 315.
3. Where title of drawee of city warrant to the money is disputed, mayor
cannot be compelled by mandamus to sign the warrant. id. " "
4. If return be sufficient in law though false in fact, a peremptory writ will
be refused until the return be falsified by action. Dane v. Derby, 190.
5. -Practice concerning. Id.
MAP. See DEED, 11 ; MUNIOIPAL CORPORATION, 9.
MARITIME LIEN. See ADMxRALT, 1, 2.
MARK. See BILLS AND NOTES, 2.
MARRIAGE. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, I.
MARRIAGE SETTLEMENT. See HUSBAND AND WIFE, 15, 16.
MASTER AND SERVANT. See RAILROAD, 14-19.
1. Constructive service-remedy of servant discharged before end of nis
engagement. Note to Huntington v. Ogdensburgh B. B. Co., 147.
2. Master not liable for injury from negligence of fellow servant though of
a.different grade and engaged in different kind of work if both were at-work
on different parts of same general purpose. Faulkner v. .. 1. Co., 509.
MATERIAL-MEN AND THEIR LIENS, 513.
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Where title to two adjoining closes unites, all subordinate rights and ease-
ments are extinguished! Warren v. Blake, 442.
MILITARY SERVICE. See BOUNTY, 1; TAXATiON, 2.
1. Congress has power to prohibit state judges from interfering with enlist-
ments by habeas corpus, and the acts of 1862 and 1864 have assumed exclusive
jurisdiction on this subject. Afatter of O'Conner, 60.
2. Enlistment and desertion may be proved otherwise than by record-cus-
tont of substitute brokers-town quota. Lebanon v. Heath, 315.
3. Money paid to broker for substitute who proved to be a deserter, may be
recovered in action for money had. Id.
MINING LEASE.
1. Covenants to pay rent for coal taken out and to take out certain quan-
tity. Separate covenants as to contiguous mines. Powell v. Burroughs, 315.
2. Damages for breach of such covenant. Uncertainty of extent of injury
a criterion in distinguishing between penalty and liquidated damages. Id.
MISNOMER. See CRnI.AL LAW, 8.
MISREPRESENTATION. See FLSE REPRESENTATION.
MORTGAGE. See BOND, 1, 2 ; DEED, 1; INTERNATIoNAL LAw, 2; STAxPS,
8-10.
Separate-defeasance withheld from record to defraud creditors is valid and
will be enforced between parties. Clark v. Condit, 763.
MORTMAIN. " ei CooRPAzTbox, 16.
MUNICIPAL BONDS. See COURTS, 5 ; MUNICIPAL CORPoRATIoN.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATION. See HIGHWAY, 1-5; M.ANA US, 3.
1. The power of a municipal corporation to borrow money is entirely dis-
tinct from those powers bestowed upon it for public purposes, and pertaining
to its functions as a local government, exercising a part of the sovereignty of
the state. De Voss v. City of Richmond, 589.
2. In the exercise of a power to borrow money, a municipal corporation
quoad hoc, is to be treated as a private person or an ordinary trading corpora-
tion, and will be held to the same degree of responsibility for the acts of its
officers and agents. Id.
3. Where a city issues its registered bonds, and invites the public to deal
upon the faith of them as the ultimate evidence of title, it cannot be heard to
gainsay their validity in the hands of a bond ffde holder, although in the issu-
ing of the bonds the agents of the city violated their instructions. Id.
4. Therefore the city of Richmond was estopped to aeny the vralidity of a
registered bond regularly transferred and in the hands of a .bond fide pur-
chaser, even though such bond was issued by its transfer officer in disregard
of instrctions to make a certain recital on the face of the bond,which if made
would have notified the.purchaser of the facts creating the alleged invalidity,
and this because, by its ordinances, the city had declared that the delivery of
a registered bond, with a power of transfer, should operate to pass the com-
plete title, both at law and in equity, to a bond fide purchaser; saving, *hat
all payments by'the city to the registered owner should be deemed valid. Ad.
5. Where a city charter required that all work should be let by contract to
the lowest bidder, held, that the city authorities could not contract at all for
-laying the Nicholson pavement, the right to lay it beihg a patented right and
owned by a single firm, and, therefore, the work beug one which could not be
open to competition. Dean v. Charlton, 564.
6. The fact that in article is patented, does not necessarily prevent any
person but the patentee from contracting to supply .4: others may do so, takrng
the risk of being able to obtain the patentee's license. Hobart v. ietroit, 741.
7. Therefore, where a city charter provides that no contracts shall be made
by the city, except with the lowest bidder, after advertisement of proposals, it
does not prevent the city from contracting for a liatented article, such as the
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Nicholson pavement, although in point of fact the only bidder was the patentee,
who held a monopoly of the article. Hobart v. Ietroit, 741.
8. Report of commissioners on altering street. People v. Brooklyn, 317.
9. Owner who lays out land in streets, and sells lots by a map publicly
exhibited, dedicates the streets to the public, but they do not become public
highways until accepted by the corporation. Pops v. Union, 701.
10. Discretion as to acceptance of streets is exclusively for the corporation.
Id.
NAME. See CRIMINAL LAw, 8.
NAVIGABLE STREA2,X. See RIVER.
NAVY. See MILITARY SERVICE, 1.
.NE EXEAT.
1. Will be issued only for an equitable demand for a certain sum actually
due, or for an account where some sum is due. MacDonough v. Gaynor, 701
. 2. Practice in regard to. Id.
NEGLIGENCE. See ADMIRALTY, 4-7; BAILMENT, 4; CoMMON CARRIER;
MASTER AND SERVANT, 2; RAILROAD.
1. The owner is liable for injury done. by an animal which is-known to be
fierce or dangerous, though it does not belong to'a classferw nature. Oakes
v. Spaulding, 551.
2. Where such an animal is the joint property of two persons, one of whom
allows the other to have charge of it, both are liable to a person injured. Id.
3. Railroad company allowing another company to use its road is liable for
* accidents to its own passengers from the other company's negligence. R. B.
Co. v. Barrodl, 124.
4: Damages for death depend very much on the facts of the particular case.
It is not necessary that the next of kin entitled to damages should have been
entitled to support by the decedent. Id.
5. Husband may sue for deaih of wife. Measure of damages. Hyatt v.
Adams, 191.
6. Peculiarly a question of fact. Woodin v. Austin, 763.
NEGROES." See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, X.
NEW. TRIAL.
1. For after-discovered evidence. Ordivay v.,Haynes, 316.
2. Conversations had with jurors about the case on trial by thb friends oi
the prevailink party, intended and calculated to influence the verdict, consti-.
tute a sufficient cause to warrant the court in granding a new trial, even though
not shown to have influenced the verdict in point of fact, and though they
were had without the procurement or knowledge of the prevailing party, and
listened to by the jurors without understanding thpt they were guilty of mis-
conduct in so doing. McDaniels v.. McDaniels, 729.
• 3. A motion for a new trial, upon the ground of misconduct by jurors
during the trial, need not contain an averment that the misconduct was
unknown to the moving party before the jury retired. It would seem to bo
otherwise when the objection to the juror is some matter which existed before
the trial commenced, and which might have been a cause for challenge. Id.
4. The fact that the moving party neglected to inform the court, before the
jury retired, of misconduct on the part of jurors during the trial which came
to his knowledge, would not, if proved, necessarily, as a metter of law, defeal
-the motion for a new trial, but would be one circumstance to be considered
with others by the court in determining whether, in their discretion, to set
aside the verdict. Id.
NICHOLSON PAVEMENT. See MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 5-7.
NOTICE. See BRonER, 2-5 ; COMMON CARRIER, -1, 7, 10; ESTATE TAIL;
GUARDIAN, ' ; PARTNERSHIP, 6; RAILROAD, 25; VENDOR, Il.
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NUISANCE. See RAILROAD, 24; TnESPASS, 1.
1. A tomb upon one's own land, is not necessarily a nuisance, but it may
become such from localiy and other facts. Barnes v. Hathorn, 81.
2. Plaintiff proved that defendant's tomb, erected within forty-four feet of
the former's dwelling-house, contained, in 1856, nine dead bodies, from which
was emitted such an effluvium as to render his house unwholesome; that,
after an examination by physicians, the bodies were removed; that the tomb
remained unoccupied thereafterwards, until 1865, when another body was
therein interred ; that the plaintiff's life was made uncomfortable while occu-
pying his dwelling-house, by the apprehension of danger arising from the use
bf said tomb; and, that the erection and occupation of said tomb had materi-
ally lessened the market value of his premise. In an action for damages
on the foregoing facts: Held, a nonsuit was improperly ordered. ITd.
3. Cases on the subject of nuisance collected. Note to Barnes v. Hathorn,
86.
4. Where a particular kind of fuel, the use of which is productive of injury
to the owners of neighboring property, is necessary in the course of a manu-
facture in which the parties using it are largely engaged, and whose products
the public require; and the process of manufacture and fuel used are generally
employed in similar establishments, and there is neither a wilful or negligent
infliction of injury, equity will not enjoin against the use of such fuel ; but
will leave the party complaining to his action at law for damages. Richards
v. Phnix Iron Co., !k'i.
5. Semble, that if tile use of such fuel in the particular manufacture were
unnecessary; pnd other fuel was equally good and available, or that-by a rea-
sonable expenditure of money in the manufacturing works all injury might
be avoided, equity would enjoin against it as a nuisance, where injury was
inflicted upon neighboring property. Id.
6. The objection to a factory or other building in a city that it will prevent
the use of the neighboring ground for such buildings aswould, in the ordinary
course of affairs and the extension of the city, be erected there, is not a ground
for interferhnce by a court of equity. The subject presented by such objection
is one of public policy, not of private right, with which courts deal. Rhodes
v. Dunbar, 412.
7. A court of equity will not interfere with a particular use of a building
or lot of ground unless -it amounts to a -nuisance at law for which damages
might be recovered, und for.which damages merely wouli not be an adequate
remedy. Id.
8. Mere diminution of value of surrounding property is not a ground for
injunction. Id. -
9. Smoke, noiseiand liability to fire as elements of nuisauce, in a city. Id.
10. Noise and jar o machinery may be nuisance to dwelling-house or inn,
eut vidence that guests declared they left the inn on that account is not admis-
sible. Wesson v. Iron Co., 125.
11. Person making excavation' in highway liable for, injuries resulting.
Portland v. Bicharison, 446.
12. If an injury to -property of an.individual he may sue for it though
others are injuied in like manner. King v. R. R. Co., 764.
OFFICE AND OFFICER. See BA.x, 2; EXECUTION, 2, 3.
1. The term for which the incumbent of an office, whose duration was
limited by law, had been appointed by the President with the concurrence of
the Senate, expired when the Senate was'in session. No appointment in which
the Senate concurred was made at that session, and the-President, in the en-
suing recess, appointed-another person to the office by a commission to expire
at the end of the next session of the Senate. It seems that the former incumL
bent's term was not extended by the Tenure of Office Act of March 2d, 1867 ; ,
and thiat as he had been appointed before that Act, Congress could not consti-
tutionally have prolonged by it his bfficial tenure without a new appointment
by the President and concurrence of the Senate, as to the -additional period.
Case of the District Attorney, 786.
2 It seems also that the commission of the subsequent appointee was of no
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effect, the vacancy not having happened during a recess of the Senate, and the
President therefore having no constitutional power to make a temporary ap.
pointment. Case of the District Attorney, 786.
3. Office is public station or employment conferred by government, and
embraces the ideas of tenure, duration, emolument and duties. U. S. v. Hart-
well, 446.
4. Officer under Sub-Treasury Act of Aug. 6, 1846. Id.
5. A tribunal authorized by law to decide upon the sufficiency of sureties
for official duty, cannot postpone its decision because the title to the office is
elsewhere disputed. Commonwealth ex rd. Ballier v. Common Council of Phila-
delphia, 362.
6. An officer not coilamissioned is authorized to enter upon the performance
of the duties upon the certificate of election delivered by the return, judges.Id.
7. Contested right-ouster on quo warranto.and supersedeas by writ of error,
salary is measure of damages in suit on bond. U. S. v. Addison, 575.
OHIO. See RIvEn, 1.
FARENT AND CHILD. See INFANT.
Rule requiring express promise to pay for child's services after coming of
age applies to adopted child. Lunay v. Vantine, 764.
"rARTITION.
1. By parol is invalid, notwithstanding boundaries marked and several occu-
pation of the purparts for less than twenty years. Ballou v. Hall, 255.
2. Complainant must show title and if disputed must establish it by action
at law. Hay v. Estell, 702.
3. A sale under a writ of partition is a judicial stle, and discharges the.
lien of judgments and of a mortgage by one of the tenants in common of his
undi-ided portion. F. 4- M. Bank v. Girard Ins. Co., 467.
4. Such mortgage is discharged in Pennsylvania although it be a first mort-
gage and have priority of all other liens. The Acts of 1830 and 1845 only
preserve the lien of such mortgage from discharge by sale under a writ of
execution. Id.
5. What irregularities in the proceeding for partition will not vitiate it. Id.
PARTNERSIP. See BANKRUPTCY, 48, 68-75 ; DEBTOR ANID CREDITOR,'2;
JOINT DEBTO' A8.
'1. A note given by partners is not a joint and several obligation in a tech-
nical sense, though it has some of the qualities of a several obligation. Mason
v. Rldred, 402.
2. Therefore a judgment upon a partnership notf against one of the makers
is at common law a bar to a subsequent suit against the other partner who had
not been served with process in the first suit, .d.
3. But in Michigan the rule is otherwise bystatut6. Id.
4., Note in "fact for partnership debt, but signed by .ne partner only, is
good against all as between themselves. Sprague v. Ainsworth, 575.
5. Purchase by one partner of another's interest, with bond to indemnify.
Bunton v. Dunn, 447.
6. Retiring partner liable to creditor of the firm, unless the latter had notice
or was put on inquiry. What amounts to notice. Zollar v. .Tanvrin, 252.
7. Failure of one to pay in his proportion of the capital does not authorize
others to exclude him- from the partnership. Hartman v. Woehr, 765.
8. Articles providing for continuance of partnership during continuance of
lease, renewable at option of one partner, he is not bound to renew.. Phillips
v. Reeder, 765.
9. On dissolution, majority have no right to dispose of another's share
without hip consent, or to compel him to sell or divide, except by judicial pro-
ceedings. Id.
10. Partner has no authority to submit partnership matter to arbitration so
as to bind the firm. St. Martin v. Thrasher 764. "
11. Presence of partner, who understood English imperfectly, at conversa-
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tion resulting in submission of partnership matter to arbitration, not conclu-
sive of his assent.' St. Martin v. Thrasher, 764.
PARTY-WALLS.
1. An agreement between adjoining owners of a town lot, A. and B., that
'A. might build a party-wall equally upon the land of both, and that whenever
B. should build upon his lot so as to use the wall, he would pay one-half of
the cost thereof, is not a covenant running with the laud so as to entitle C.,
who had purchased A.'s lot, upon the performance of the condition as to the
rise of the wall, to sue B. for the money. Bloch v. Isham, 8.
2. Early English laws concerning. Principles applicable to. Note tu
Bloch v. Isham, I0.
PATENT. See MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 5-7.
PATENTING A PRINePLE, 129.
PAYMENT.' See DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, II.
PENALTY. See DAMAGES," 11; MINING LEASE, 2.
PENSION AGENT. See BOUNTY, 2.
PENT ROAD. See HrGiwAT, 7.
PLAN. See DEED, 11; MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 9.
"PLEADING. See ACTION, 2; ARBITRATION, 1; HIGHWAT, 4 ; Tnzs ass, 2,
3; TitovEZ,,3..
1. .Payment is an affirmative plea. Kendall v. Bromnson, 316.
2. Plea of covenants performed absque hoc is a negative plea, and gives
plaintiff the condlusion to the jury. Smith v. Frazier, 125.
PROMISSORY NOTE. See Buw AND Noms.
PUBLIC LAI_ D"ING. See RIvER, 3-7Z
PUBLIC WORKS. See ASSUMPSIT, 3; CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 11.
Advertisement inviting proposals to bid for construction of works does not
create any obligation to award a contract.' People v. Croion Aqueduct Board,
509. ,
RAILROAD. See Com IbN CARRER; CONSTITUTIONAL, LAW, 6 ;. ConPoR&-
TION; INSURANCE, 5; LEGAL TENDER NOTES; NEGLIGENCE, 3-6.
1. LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE, 449.
2. RAILWAY MANAG NMNT Ailb RESPONSintLitY, 577.
3. Where a passenger on a railway train is injured by the misconduct of a
fellow-passenger, tle company is liable only itt case there was "negligence -in
its officers in not making proper'effdrts to prevent the injury." Pittsbuigh,
,4c., Railiay Co. v. Binds apnd Wif, 14.
4. Railroad companies are bound to furnish men enough for the ordinary
demands of transportation, but not a -police force adequate to extraordinary
emergenies,--as to quell mobs by the-wayside. rd.
4. It is negligence in a conductor to voluntarily admit improper persons or
undue numbers into the cars. 1d;
6. Where the evidence shows that an excited crowd, at away-station, among
.whom Were" drunken and disorderly persons, rushed .upon the cars in such
Ilumbers as to defy the resisting power at the disposal of the conductor, it is
error in the court to'submit that to the jury from which they may find negli-
gence in the conductor in'admitting in the cars either improper persons or
undue numbers. Id. ".
7. In case of fighting orldisorder in the cars the conductor must at once do
all he can to quell it. If necessary, he should stop the train, call to his aid
the engineer, firemen, all the brakesmen and willing passengers, leid the way
himself and expel the offenders, or demonstrate by an earnest experiment,
that the undertaking is impossible. Id.
8. It is negligence for a passenger on a railroad train to put his arm out of
the car window, and if the facts are undisputed that the injury resulted from
VoL. XVI.-55 -
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this cause, the Court should pronounce it negligence as a matter cf law
Pittsburgh 4 Conndlsville R? B. Co. v. McClurg, 277.
9. There may be qualifying circumstances in the condition of the passenger
which would make special care the duty of the carrier, but such facts should
be proved as part of the case. Id.
10. The case of the New Jersey Railroad Co. v. Kennard, 9 Harris 203, so
far as it decided that it is the duty of railroad companies to place guards on
their car windows so as to prevent passengers from putting their limbs out
overruled. Id.
11. It is negligence for a passenger in a railroad car to allow his arm to
project out of the window, and if he receive injury from such position he can
not recover. Indianapolis and Cincinnati R. R. Co. v. Ruthe1ford, 476.
12. The railroad company is not bound to put bars across its windows te
prevent passengers from putting their limbs out. Id.
13. In an action against a railroad compiny for injury caused by an acci
dent, evidence that the conductor was intemperate or otherwise incompetent is
-admissible to raise a presumption of negligence. Pennsylvania t. R. Co. v.
Books, 524.
14. Admissions or declarations of thie employees of the company, made sub.
sequently to the accident, are not competent evidence. Such declarations are
only competent as part of the res estceo and the declarations of fin officer of
the company stand upon the same footing. fid.
15. In an action for damages by a person injured by negligenced, evidence
of the number of plaintiff's family or of his habits and industry is not admis-
sible unless special damage is averred. Id.
16. It is no justification for the employment of an ingompetent servant that
competent ones were difficult to obtain. Id.
17. Where a person injured by a railroad accident had accepted a ticket or
pass aescribing him as " route agent, an employee of the Railroad Co.," this
pass is competent evidence for the company, but it does not estop the plaintiff
from showing that he was not, in fact, an employee of the company. Id.
18. In an action for injury by negligence the damages should be compensation
for the actual injury,-and it is error to leave the measure and amount of dam-
ages, as well as the rules by which they are to be estimated, entirely to the
jury. Id:
19. Not liable to employee injured by falling of bridge from defect not per-
ceptible to competent engineer. Faulkner v. R. R. Co., 510.
20. Agent in charge of depot and freight is proper person of. whom to
inquire of lost baggage, and his answer is part bf res gestoa. Curtis v. 2. R.,
125.
21. If passenger at end of his journey leaves his' baggage without any
arrangement, the company is not liable, but an arrangement with the bag-
gage-master to take charge of it will bind the compatLy. Id.
22. Evidence that passeugei is lame and unable to take personal charge of
baggage is admissible to rebut the presumption of negligence from his leaving
it. Id.
23. Wood, timber, &c., distributed along the line for present use are par.
of it for purposes of taxation. R. R. Co. v. Prescott, 255.
24. Railroad company bound to operate its road so as to cause the least
danger to buildings on the line, and the fact that the building was erected after
the road does not alter the case. King v. R. R. Co., 764.
25. Mlust receive goods as a common carrier, but may make special con-
tract. Acceptance of bill of lading with conditions, is an agreement to the
conditions. Mclfillan v. R. B. Co., 191.
26. Interference with rights in property and restoration to same condition
again. Arnold v. 2?. R. Co., 380.
REAL ESTATE. See DEED, 12; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 11, 22; VENDOR, -I
1. Surplus of proceeds of decedent's lands sold to pay debts remains realty
Oberle v Lerch, 765.
2. Law of state where lands lie will determine the question of real or per.
sonal estate, though owner be resident of another state. Id.
. INDEX. 867
RECEIVER. See CORPORATION, 19.
Signing bond to, is an admission not only of obligee's character as receiver,
but of the right to sue. Scott v. Duncombe, 381.
RECORDING ACTS. See DEED, 1 ; STA-4Ps, 9.
REMIAINDER.
Liable to execution if vested. Nichols v. Lev,, 120.
RENT. See BANKEUPTbT, 57-60; LANDLORD AND TENANT; REPLEvIN.
REPLEVIN.
1. In avowry in replevin for rent in arrear, the rent reserved must be
accurately stated; rent in arrear need not be. Phipps v. .Boyd, 316.
2. Averments and evidence in such case. Id:
3. Action on replein bond. Tuck v. Moses, 447.
4. Lies against express company after tender of legal charges. Eveld v
Blossom, 447.
5. Lies only against person having possession or control of goods. Rams-
dell v. Buswell, 447.
6. Property bond. Death of plaintiff. Liability of defendant. Emerson
v. -Booth, 766.
REVENUE ACTS. See INTERNAL REVENUE.
REVERTER. See COnrORATION, 17.
RIPARIAN OWNER. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 3; RIVER ; TIDE WATERS.,
RIVER.. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 5 ; TIDE WATERS.
1. The Ohio river being a great navigable highway between states, the
public have all the rights that by law appertain to navigable streams, as
against riparian owners; but the public rights are upon the river, not upon
the banks. Bainbridge vt Sherlock, 720.
2. The title of the riparian owner extends to low-water mark. Id.
3. The right to use the river as a highway does not imply the right to use
the banks for the purposes of landing, to receive and discharge freight and
passengers. Except in cases of peril or emergency, the navigator has no legal
right to land, without consent of the riparian owner, at places other than those
that have in some way become public landing-places. Id.
4. Riparian owners may extend wharves to, and into the navigable portion
of, the river, provided they do not unnecessarily obstruct navigation. Id.,
5. Whoever would maintain a wharf for the accommodation of any particular
class of vessels, should possess a sufficient water-front to contain, that class
of vessels, without obstructing access to the lands of contiguous proprietors.
Id.
6. A wharf-boat moored to the shore, is entitled to the same immunity from
trespass, or obstruction by vessels navigating the river , as is the land itself to
which the wharf-boat is moored. Id.
7. The navigator landing at one wharf with permission of the wharfinger,
is not justified by any public right in the river, in so landing and mooring
his vessel, as that while landed its side and stern will be carried by the current
against the wharf-boat of a contguous wharfinger lower down the river, thereby
obstructing access to the lower wharf. Id.
8. Owner of land no right to corrupt stream. Merriyield v. Lombad, 126.
SALE. See BAILMENT; 1; FRtAUDS, STATUTE OF; TROVER, 1; TRUST, 3:
VENDOR.
1. Of all tools, &c.,'nn a farm-parol evidence admissible to explain what
speci6c property included. Rugg v. Hale, 638. . ,
2. Incorrect description of locality of personal property sold does not affect
the sale. Id.
SALVAGE. See INSURANCE, 14.
SECESSION. See CONFEDERATE STATES.
SECURITY. See BILLS AND NOTES, 12.
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SERVANT. See CONTRACT, 1, 2; CORPORATiON, 20; MA STER AND SERVANT t
RAILROAD, 16.
SERVICE. See ATTORNEY, 7.
SET-OFF.
Equitable claim may be set off against one purely legal. R. R. Co. v. R.
R. Co., 186.
SHERIFF. See EXECUTION, 1.
SHIPPING. See ADMIRALTY; INSURANCE, 14-16.
1. Place where services are in fact rendered is place where debt is contracted
within the N. Y. statuth for collecting debts against vessels. Mullin v. Hicks,
511.
2. Master running vessel on shares is not owner nor charterer, but has the
ordinary powers of a master. McCready v.-Thorne, 576.
3. Sale of vessel by master in a distant port-requisites to validity, and
effect of. The .Amdie, 317.
- 4. Vessel cannot have permanent and temporary registry at same time.
Chadwick V. Baker, 192.
5. Under Act of July 29, 1850, bill of sale must be recorded in office from
which the last register issued. "d.
SIGNATURE. See BILLS AND NOTES, 2; BYIDENCE, 9.
*SLAVE. See CONSTuUTONA. LAW, X.; HUSBAND AND WIrE, 3.
SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE. See VENDOR, 5.
STAMPS. See BILLS AND NOTES, 5; LIMITATIOiS, 2.
1. By the Act of Congress of 1864, receipts for goods delivered to a com-
mon carrier for transportation, being in effect inland bills of lading, Were pxot
subject to stamp duty. United States v. Baltimore and Ohio . B. Co., 757.
2. A corporation is liable to indictment for the act of its officer or em-
ployee, in issuing papers which the law requires to be stamped, without the
proper stamps, with intent to evade the provisions of the Act of Congress. Id.
3. Innocent omission to stamp a note does not make it inadmissible in evi.
dence. Tobey v. Chipman, 64.
4. An insolveit's bond is in legal proceedings and need not be stamped.
McGovern v. rosback, 64.
t. Voluntary bond unstamped not void, unless omission was to evade the
Act of Congress. rd.
6. Under the.At of 1864 a summons from a justice where the amount
claimed is over $100, requires a stamp. Cole v. Bell, 255.
7. Want of stamp being a question affecting jurisdiction, is not waived by
omission to specify it as a ground of error. Id.
8. Chattel mortgages not within the provisibn of te Act authorizing stamp-
ing of mortgages by collector, when stamps omitted without intent to evade
the law. Vail v. Knapp, 511.
9. Such mortgages in N. Y. are merely filed not recorded. Id.
10. Not necessary on moitgage to secure contingent liabilities. Id.
STATUTE.
1. Penal statute may receive full meaning of the words, or even the more
extensive of two meanings. U. S. v. Hartwell, 446.
2. To be construed by the meaning as expressed to those who are to be
governed by it. Legislator's intent not to be declared by himself. Steamboat
Co. v. Transportation Co., 766.
STOCK. See BROkER, 2-5 ; CORPORATION.
STOPPAGE IN TRANSITU. See VENDOR, 19-21.
STREAM. See RIvER; TIDE WATERs.
STREET. See DEED, 11 ; MUNICIPAL CORPORATION, 8-10.
SUBSTITUTE BROKER. See MILITARY SERVICE, 2, 3.
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SUNDAY. See Co.MoN CARRIER, 16
1. Secular labor of any kind is violation of law, and a disturbance of others
if done in their presence even with their consent. George v. George, 319.
2. Execution of will not labor within the statute. Id.
SURETY
1. Where the principals and three sureties signed a promissory note, after
which, and before delivery, by an arrangement between the principals and the
surety whofirst signed the note, his name was erased therefrom without the
knowledge or consent of the other sureties; and the note was then delivered
to the payee in a condition which showed upon its face that the name of the
surety who first signed the same had been erased; whereupon, the note was
received with knowledge of the relation of principal and surety existing
between themakers: it was held: 1st. That the discharge of the suretyreleased
the co-sureties who signed the note when his name was upon it. 2d. That
the payee received the note under circumstances which would put a reasonably
prudent man upon inquiry; and was charged with knowledge of the rights of
the'co-sureies. It was also hdd, that if the makers of the note were all prin-
cipals the erasure of the name of one would be a discharge of the others only
pro tanto. McCramer v. Thompson et al.; 92.
2. To make negligence of creditor that .will exonerate surety the request
- must be to collect the debt by process of law; a request to push the debtor is
not en6ugh unless that term meant and was -understood by the creditor to
mean by process of law. Singer v. Troutman, 126.
3. Indulgiijce of principal by creditor with consent of surety does not dis-
charge the latter; and consent is a question for the jury. Treat v. Smith, 447.
.'AXATION. See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 8; HUSBAN" AND WIFE, 14;
INTERNAL REvsEn, 6; RAILROAD CompA&rr, 23.
1. Where the owfier of an unseated tract, lying partly in county S., pro-
cures a survey, and returns to the county commissioners fortaxation a descrip.
tion of the'land as 55 acres lying-in S..county, part of a tract containing 349
acres, the residue lying in N. county, with the warrantee's name, and it is so
assessed, and the taxes are paid for two years, and in the following year the
assessment is so changed in name and quantity that the owner, seeking to
pay the taxes, is unable to ascertain that the'tract. is taxed, and therefore does
not pay the tax, a sale for such taxes does not pass the owner's title. Bret-
taugh v. Locust Mountain Coal C., 109.
2. Exemption on account of military service is a personal privilege not
extending to wife's property. Crawford v. Burrell Toumwsip, 126.
3. Act legitimating children of testator after devise to.them has vested,
does not relieve from cdllateral inheritance tax. Conn'th v. Stump, 61.
4. ote to sustain a school-:--effect of such vote not to be enlaiged b- intei-
tion of v6ters. 'Adams 
v. Crowdl, 576.
5.. S. C. of N. Y. wilI not use its equitypowers to stay' assesMent and
collection of a tai.' "Messeck v. Supervisors, 637. - "
-TLEGRAPH. See CoseoN CARRIR'; 'CONTRACT, 3. . "
1. Telegraph companies, in the absence of any provision of-the Atatute, are
not common carriers, and their obligatiohs and liabilities are not to e mea-
sured by the same rules, but mustbe fixed by considerations growing out of
the nature of the bisiness in which they are engaged. They do not become
insurers againsterrors in the transmission of messages, except so far as by
their rules and regilations, or by contract, they. choow. to assume that posi-
tion. Western Union.Tdegraph Co. v. Carew, 18.
2. When a person writes a message under a Ointed notice, requesting the
company to send such message according to the conditions of such notice, held,
that the printed blank was a general proposition to all personia of the terms
and conditions upon which messages would be sent, and that by writing said
message and delivering it to the company, the pdrty must be held as accepting
the proposition, and that such act becombs a contractupon those terms and
conditions. Id.
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3. Where a telegraph company established regulations to the effect'that it
would not be responsible for errors or delay in the transmission of unrepeated
messages, and further, that it would assume no liability for any error or
neglect committed by any other company over whose lines a message might
be sent in the course of its destination, held, that such regulations were rea-
sonable and binding on those dealing with the company. Western Union Tel-
egraph Co. v. Carew, 18.
4. May limit liability by rules as to repetition of messages, and writing
message on company's blank, with printed conditions, will be evidence of
notice of such rules. Bllis v. Tel. Co., 127.
TENANT *IN COMMON.
1. Cannot maintain trover against co-tenant for taking all the crops. Bal-
iou v. Hall, 255.
2. Not bound to account. Wilcox v. Wilcox, 127.
3. Married woman tenant in common of property occupied by her and her
husband-husband not bound to account. Id.
TENIER. See DEBTOR AND CREDITOR, Ir.; CONTRACT, 8 ; VENDOR, 7.
TEXAS.
Citizen of United States who was alien in Texas became citizen of Texas on
admission of that state. Osterman v. Baldwin, 317.
THREATENING LETTER.
In action for writing, the loss or inconvenience sustained must be direct
result of the letter, and be more than mental suffering. Taft v. Taft, 636.
TIDE WATERS. See COxSTITUTIONAI, LAW, 3.
1. Old division line between lands to prevail. Stockham v. Browning, 767.
2. Rights of riparian owners. Id.
3. No rule established in N. J. to determine the line by which shore in front
of coterminous shore owners shall be divided between them. Id.
TIMBER. See DEED, 12; HUSBAND AND WIFE, 11, 18; RAILROAD, 23;
VENDOR, 13.
TITLE. See AtnITRATroN, 4; DEED, I.; EQUITY, 6; ESTATE TAIL; FRAUD
r,
ST&TiUTE OF, 1; VENDOR, 10, 23.
TOWN. See HIGHrWAY; MUNICIPAL CORPORATION.
TRADE-MARK.
Infringement should be enjoined where the defence is he fraud or imposition
of plaintiff, and the evidence is conflicting, bdt if the imposition is flagrant
the court should suggest this defence. Smith v. Woodruff, 191.
TRESPASS. See VEDon, 6.
1. Will not in general be restrained by injunction, but may be if amounts
to nuisance. Morris Canal Co. v. Pagan, 700.
2. If declaration sets out matter so that it may be construed as a distinct
injury, or as aggravation only, defendant may treat it as the latter, and
plaintiff, if not so intending it, must reassign. Grout v. Knapp, 702.
3. For entering of cattle, if defendant does not allege defective fence plain-
tiff not bound to prove it in good order. Sorenberger v. Houghton, 703.
TRTAL See BANKEUPTCY, 76-79 ; EVIDEnCE, 2.
TROVER. See AssuarSIT, 4; TENANT IN CoMON, 1.
I. Sale of another's property under belief of ownership is conversion
Morrilt v. Moulton, 639.
2. May be maintained by officer against receipter for goods attached on
nesne process. Holt v. Burbank, 318.
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TROVER.
3. Special plea denying conversion amounts to general issue. Turner v
Waldo, 576.
4. Lessor and lessee owned stock on farm jointly, to be divided at end of
lease. Lessee dying, his administrator has no more right to sell the stock
than lessee himself had, and if he does so, lessor may recover in trover the
value of his interest. Id.
TRUST AND TRUSTEE. See EXECUTOR, 6; GUARDIAN, 2; HUSBAND ANr
WIFE, 17 ; VENDOR, 12.
I. Attachment of funds in his hands as trustee. Groome v. Lewis, 255.
2. Statute of Frauds not a defence in case of resulting trust. Brannin v.
Brannin, 698.
3. Party promising to bid at sale for another who stays away, relying on
the promise, will be held a trustee if he buys for his own benefit, notwith-
standing the Statute of Frauds. Id.
4. Contributions to a fund for a specific purpose are 'in hands of trustee
only for that purpose, and.surplus cannot be used for any other without con-
sent of every contributor. Abets v. McKeen, 767. -. 5. Trustee who has abused his trust not entitled to commissions, but may
be allowed compensation for special services. M1oore v. Zabrfskie, 767.
UNITED STATES NOTES. See CoIx.
UNSEATED LAND. See TAxA'SiON, .
USAGE. . See CUSTOM.
USURY.
Mode of pleading. Bank v. Orenth, 127.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER. See Fntins, STATUTz Or S rA.
I. Of Beal Estate.
1. Where a vendor of real estate on default in the terms of payment by ven-
dee, goes into a court of" equity and has the contract declared void and of no
effect, and is remitted to his original title and possession, this is not a proceed-
ing in rescission, but in. affirmatice of the contract, and- does not entitle the
vendee to recover back the part of the purchase-money already paid. Hans-
brougk et al. v. Peck, 74.
2-. A purchaser of real estate, who has paid part of his purcbase-money or
done an act in part performance of his agreement and then refuses to complete
his contract, the vendor being willing to do his part, will not be permitted to
recover back what has been thus advanced or done. Id.
'.'Where a parol'promise is substantially the same as a previous writitn
one, and hathing is done under the latter which the promissor was not already
bound to do, under the former, no new consideration passing bet*een the par.
ties, the.existence or enforcement of the parol contract cannot be set up as a
rescission of the former. written one. Zd.
4. A purchaser after payment of part of the purchase-money, intended to
abandon the contract, and the vendor promised, if he would pay up arrears, to
indulge him for a certain time. The purchaser paid up the arrears, but the
vendor enforced his contract within-the time (as alleged) that he promised to
forbear. Hed, that there~was no consideration for the promise, the purchaser
having done nothng-he was.not already bound to do by his original contract.
Id.
5. Vendor being ablb-to convey only part of the land agreed upon, vendef
may compel specific performance as to that part. Covell v. seley, 191."
6. Vendee entering under contract to purchase and failing to fulfil it, may
be treated as a trespasser or tenant at will. "Wood1ury v. Woodb'ry,. 318.
7. If vendor unable.to perform his agreement at time, purchaser need not
tender performance of his part. Karke v. Haverly, 639.
8. Waiver by acts of purchaser. Id.
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9. Damages for breach of agreement to reconvey. Lawrence v. Ciase,
441.
10. Agreement to sell and authorizing purchaser to take immediate posses-
sion passes equitable title at once, and destruction of building by fire after
such contract, is no defence to action forpurchase-money. McKechie v. Ster-
ling, 128.
11. The expression "more or less" in describing quantity of land is notice
to the purchaser that quantity is not of the essence of the contract. Slothower
v. Gordon, 251.
12. Sales by trustees stand upon the same rules as to representations, and
the rule caveat emptor, as other sales. Id.
13. Construction of'contract for sale of standing timber with stipulation of
vendee to cut and carry away. Murphy v. Garland, 318.
14. Simple representation of value not a warranty. French v. Griffn, 703.
II. Of Chattels.
15. Where the consignee of the cargo of a vessel at sea, sells the cargo and
delivers the bill of lading, properly endorsed, to the purchaser, the sale is
valid and passes the complete title to the goods. Audenreid v. Randall, 659.
16. Delivery of the bill of lading is, under the circumstances, a sufficient
delivery of the goods to take the case out of the operation of the Statute of
Frauds. Id.
17. If the purchaser. afterwards refuse to accept the goods, vendor may sell
them and recover the loss from the purchaser. Id.
18. On the 16th of March, at Boston, A. sold to B. a cargo of coal then at
sea, and delivered to B., properly indorsed, a bill of lading, dated March
13th, at Philadelphia, and also a bill of sale of the coal, dated also March
13th, though the evidence showed that it was in fact made on the 16th, and
was part of the transaction at Boston on that day. Before the arrival of the
coal, B. offered A. one dollar a ton to take it off his hands, which A. refused.
On the arrival of the coal, B. refused to receive it, and claimed that the con-
tract was within the Statute of Frauds and void. After some correspondence,
A. sold the coal at public auction, and brought suit for his loss in the transac-
tion. .Held, that he was entitled to recover. Id.
19. It is a well-settled rule in the law of sales of personal property that
when anything remains to be done as between buyer and seller there is' no
delivery so as-to cut off the right of stoppage in transitu. It is not necessary
that the act remaining to be done should determine the quantity or the quality
of the goods sold, but it may be any act whatsoever, within the contemplation-
of the parties to the contract. Gill v. Pavenstedt, 672.
20. A. purchased goods warehoused in a bonded warehouse from the im-
porter, B., in whose name they were entered. The goods were bought on a
credit at a specified price, and the duties were to be paid by A. as a part of the
price. He had withdrawn by permission of B:, parcils of the goods at differ-
ent times, paying the duties on such parcels. Before the credit expired B.
gave to A. an order on the bonded warehouseman to transfer the residue of
the goods to A.'s name, which was done accordingly As between the par-
ties and the government, the goods still remained in B.'s name. They could
only be withdrawn under the regulations of the treasury department, by a
"withdrawal entry," signed by B. or by some one authorized by him in writ-
ing. While the goods were in this condition the purchaser, A., became
insolvent. He demanded that B. should sign the necessary withdrawal entry,
which the latter refused to do, except upon full payment of the price.
Held, that an act remained to be done as between buyer and seller of such
a nature that there was no delivery either actual or constructive, and that B.
bad a right of detention of the goods for the unpaid purchase-money.
Held, further, that an action in equity would not lie to compel B. to sign
the requisite withdrawal entry, since there was no trust created by the trans-
action, in the absence of payment or its equivalent. Id.
21. Statute of Vt. having taken away right'of action for recovery or pos.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER.
session of intoxicating -liquors sold contrary to law, right of stoppagp in
transfru cannot be enforced by suit. Howe v. Stewart, 638.
22. Receipt of goods. by insolvent with design not to pay for them will avoid.
the sale though he had no such design when he ordered them. Pike v. Wiet
ing, 574.
23. Party not the real owner of goods can only sell so as to pass title in
exceptional cases where he has posiession and the indicia of ownership.
iSpalding v. Brewster, 640.
VERDICT. See NEw Tn . -
T. A sealed special verdict so expressed as to be ambiguous may be reformed
and moulded by the court in presence of the jtiry, without sending the jury
out to reconsider it. Haycock v. Greup, 529.
2. If not decisive-of the real issue will be set aside, Burwell v. Great-
Aead, 38a..
3. Jury have no power to award costs, but this part of their verdict may be
treated as surplusage. Tucker v. Cochran, 254.
4. Verdict which does not find the issue raised in the pleadings but enables
the court to do so will be moulded into proper formi. Id.
VESSEL. See ADxntILTY, 4-7 ; Smnino.
VOTER AND VOTING. See CONSTITuTIONAL LAw, 1, 9; ELzcT-ox.
WAR. See INTERNATIONAL LAW, 1.
WAREHOUSE. See CnmxnAr LAw, 11; FnAUDS, STATUTE OP, 2; Vux.-
DOE, 20.
.WARRANT. See Cstncnr, I4w, 6, 7 ; t ,NDAMUs, 3.
WARRANTY.. See VzxDOx, 14J WAY, 3.
WASTE. See HUSBAND AIXDWIn, 11, 18.
WATERS AND WATERCOURSE. See HIGHwAr, 6; Rtim.
WAY. See EAsmsxT, 10.
I. Plaintiff having recovered for an obstruction to his way, agreed defend-
ant might keep it up for $30 per annum. This is a license determinable- at
the end of any year. Gilmore v. Wilson, 128..
2. Farm conveyed with right of free and uninterrupted passing over other
land of grantor, the way being then used with gates and bars,.must so con-
tinue. Garland v. Turber,256.
3. Outstanding right of way is breach of warranty. Russ v. Stede, 708.
WHARF. See Rivzz- 3-.
WILL. SeaAPpwwTro-,3; IrznEsT, .; LiumTro; SUNDAY, 2.
1. Will made by lunatic with lucid intervals, being in dispute, evidence
may be given of his instructions to draw a different will shortly before he was
found lunatic. Titlow v. Titlow, 319.
2. Legatee under a will immediately preceding that in contest is competent
witness against the latter., Id.
3. Opinions of subscribing witness. Id.
4. Will legally made, but destroyed by testator through fraud, and undue
influcuce, may be estaitlished as still in force. Voorhis v. Voorhis, 640.
5. Infant cannot make valid soldier's will. Goodell v. Pike, 703. •
6. Court being satisfied of wilful withholding of facts from it may revoke
probate. Id.
7. Devise with power .of testamentary disposition but devise over in case
of death of first devises intestate and without issue. Freeborn v. Wagnr, 512.
8. Publication in N. Y. Abbey v. Cristy, 512.
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9. Condition in devise. Rules to determine whether a strict condition or
not. Stanley v. Colt, 57.
10. If any part may take effbet will may be proved, though part of it be
void. Geore v. George, 319.
WIRT, WHIAM, 65.
WITHDRAWAL XERTRY. See VzDon, 20.
WITNESS. See AGsNT, 5; CN13NAL Lkw, 10; EVrNxoN, 5; HUSBAND
AND Wixa, 32; WLr., 2, 3.
1. 'When party may'contradict his own witness. Peope v. Skeedam, 320.
2. Competency when offered is the test of admissibility. If plaintiff is
examined and defendant dies afterwards but before hearing, plaintiff's evi-
dence to admssibl. 2tarlat v. Warwidck, 768.
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